Salt Lake City v. J.B. and R.E. Walker, Inc. : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1951
Salt Lake City v. J.B. and R.E. Walker, Inc. : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
E. Ray Christensen; City Attorney of Salt Lake City; Homer Holmgren; Assistant City Attorney of
Salt Lake City; Attorneys for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Franklin Riter; Fred L. Finlinson; Attorneys for Defendant and Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Salt Lake City v. J.B. and R.E. Walker, Inc., No. 19517437.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1951).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/42
UIT 
OF THE STATE OF ET£1 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
a Municipal Corpomti.on, 
Plaintiff; 
-vs.-
J. B. and B. E. WALKER, INC., 
a OQrpamtion, 
Defeni/,tmt, 




BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
FRANKLIN BrrER 
FRED L. FINLINSO 
A.t""'-Ya /Of' Def~ tMt4 
A.1'f"u..l. 
E: Y CHRISTENSE , 
ity Attmmey of Salt Lake City, 
Ud 
ERROLMG , 
· iut City .Alttorney of 
City. 
Alt~a fer P~iff 
-.4 ..tn.zlee. 
TABLE OF CONT'ENTS 
PAGE 
STATEMENT OF FAGTS.......................................................................... 2 
STATEMENT OF POINTS: 
POINT I. THE SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT 
DATED DECEMBER 10, 1949, IS ERRONEOUS IN ITS 
ADJUDICATION THAT PLAINTIFF OWNS AND 
HOLDS A RIGHT OF WAY ACROSS SECTION 25, 
TWP. 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE 
AND MERIDIAN, OF A MINIMUM WIDTH OF 33 
FEET ON EACH SIDE OF THE CENTER LINE OF 
SAID CONDUIT, AS CONSTRUCTED, FOR THE 
PH:OPER MAINTENANCE, REPAIR AND REPLACE-
MENT OF SAID CONDUIT .............................................................. 35 
1. The supplemental order and judgment is not supported 
by the supplemental findings of fact dated December 10, 
1949, by which the court specifically refused to deter-
mine the exact width of the right of way granted by 
Utah Light and Railroad Company to plaintiff ........................ 43 
2. The Court's Supplemental Findings of Fact, dated 
December 10, 1949, declaring that plaintiff requires a 
minimum right of way .and easement of 33 feet on each 
side of the center line of its conduit' as constructed for 
the proper maintena.nce, repair and replacement of said 
conduit 'does not support the adjudication in said sup-
plemental order and judgment that plaintiff is the owner 
and holder of such right of way across said S<!ction 25 ........ 44 
POINT II. THE PART OF FINDING OF FACT 2 WHICH 
FINDS THAT PLAINTIFF'S CONDUIT IS CON· 
STRUCTED AND INSTALLED ALONG THE CENTER 
OF RIGHT OF WAY 66 FEET WIDE IS NOT SUPPORT· 
ED BY THE EVIDENCE. THE LOCATION OF SAID 
CONDUIT ON SAID RIGHT OF WAY WAS NOT 
PROVED AND IS UNKNOWN ........................................................ 46 
POINT III. THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 2 
OF THE JUDGMENT DATED SEPTEMBER 1, 1949, 
WHICH PROHIBITS DEFENDANT AND INTERVENOR 
l•'ROM REMOVING SAND, ROCKS, GRAVEL, ETC., 
FROM PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT OF WAY, AND REQUIRES 
DEFENDANT TO HESTORE THE PLACES ON SAID 
RIGHT OF WAY FROM WHICH SOIL, ROCKS, GRAVEL, 
ETC., HAVE BEEN HEMOVED BY FILLING DECLIVI-
TIES WITH SOIL, ETC., AND REPLANTING WITH 
VEGETATION ARE ERRONEOUS ................................................ 53 
1. Defendant owned the soil, rocks, gravel, etc., on said 
right of way, and had the t•ight to remove same if by 
such removal it did not impair the safety of plaintiff's 
conduit ............................................................................................ 58 
2. There is no evidence in the record that such removal 
by defendant of so'il, etc., did imperil the safety of said 
conduit .............................................................................................. 67 
TABLE OF CONT'ENTS-(Cowtinued) 
PONT IV. THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE 
JUDGMENT DATED SEPTEMBER 1, 1949, ARE ER-
RONEOUS AND NOT CONSISTENT WITH FINDING 
14 WHICH PURPORTS TO SUPPORT SAID PROVISION 
PAGE 
OF SAID JUDGMENT ...................................................................... 69 
1. The provision of Paragraph 5 of said judgment is based 
upon "the natural slopes as they existed on January 1, 
1948, and where they had not been altered by man," as 
opposed to the provision of said Finding which is based 
upon "such Bilopes, with the'ir natural mantle of veg-
etation .and rock as presently existing." .................................... 71 
2. The slopes described in said Finding are slopes which 
were altered by the spilling of material in diggilng the 
conduit trench and the Utah Light and Railroad Com-
pany flume bench ............................................................................ 74 
3. The provisions of paragraph 5 of the jud,gment are 
therefore broader than correlative provisions of said 
Finding 14, and deprives defendant of the right to 
remove material from the area designated in said find-
]fng as being above the slopes of safety of both the 
right of way and conduit ............................................................ 74 
POINT V. FINDINGS 12, 14 AND 15, AND THE PROVI-
SIONS OF PARAGRAPHS 3, 4 AND 5 OF THE JUDG-
MENT, ARE ERRONEOUS IN THAT THEY DISTIN-
GUISH BETWEEN A SLOPE OF SAFETY FOR THE 
CONDUIT AND A SLOPE OF SAFETY FOR THE RIGHT 
OF WAY ............................................................................................ 76-77 
1. The grants of the right of way were for a w.ater conduit 
and such right of way is therefore limited to the uses 
and extent thereof fixed by 11aid grants. PJaintiff is 
therefore entitled to receive support for said conduit 
only .................................................................................................. 79 
2. The evidence shows that said conduit will receive' ade-
quate support if the slopes of safety commence at a 
point 8 to 15 feet from the center line of the conduit ............ 80 
3. The Court's findiatgs relative to slopes of safety for the 
right of way and provisions of the judgment based 
thereon ate extraneous to the issues in this case and 
deprive defendant of material which otherwise would 
have been available to it above the slopes of safety of 
the conduit ...................................................................................... 87 
POINT VI. THE JUDGMENT IS INDEFINITE, VAGUE 
AND AMBIGUOUS AND IMPOSSIBLE OF COMPLI-
ANCE BY THE DEFENDANT AND INTERVENOR ................ 88 
1. There is no requirement in said judgment that a survey 
11hall be made whereby the location of t'he boundary Hne 
of plaintiff's right of way 0!11 the side nearest Wasatch 
Boulevard will be determined so that same may be 
marked upon the ground and the record thereof pre· 
served in the court's file in this action ...................................... 91 
2. There is no requirement in said judgment that a survey 
shall be made whereby the location of the center line 
of plaintiff's conduit will be determined, so that same 
may be marked upon t'he ground 11111d the record thereof 
preserved in the court's file in this action................................ 92 
TABLE OF CONTENTS-(Con1tinued) 
POINT VII. THE EVIDENCE PREPONDERATES THAT 
MAXIMUM SLOPES OF 1 Yz TO 1 ARE SLOPES OF 
SAFETY FOR PLAINTIFF'S CONDUIT WITHOUT RE-
GARD TO THE SURFACE CONDITIONS OF THE 
PAGE 
SLOPES ---------------------------------------··············-·-·························--············· 93 
1. Summary of plaintiff's evidence.................................................. 94 
2. Summary of defendant's and intervenor's evidence ................ 96 
(a) The condui't has been and is supported in main by 
slopes averaging less than 1lh to !.. .................................. 98 
(b) An average slope of Ph to 1, with variances of the 
nature authorized by Paragraph 5 of the judgment, 
will afford adequate protection for the conduit .............. 104 
CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 118 
INDEX OF CASES CITED 
PAGE 
Baird v. Upper Canal Irr. Co., 70 Utah 57, 257 Pac. 1060 ................ 119 
Baker v. Hatch, Sheriff, et a]., 70 Utah 1, 257 Pac. 673 .................... 119 
Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, et al., 109 Utah 213, 
174 Pac. (2d) 148 ................................................................................ 60 
Cullison v. Hotel Seaside, 268 Pac. (Oregon) 758-759 ........................ 39 
Dahl v. Cayias, 110 Utah 398; 174 Pac. (2d) 430 ................................ 119 
Dierssen v. McCormack, et al., 28 Cal. App. (2d) 164, 82 Pac. 
(2d) 212 ................................................................................................ 64 
Everett Water Co. v. Powers, 79 Pac. (Washington) 617-620 ........ 38 
Green Mountain Cemetery Company's Appeal, 1 Pa. Gs. 371, 4 
Atl. 528 .................................................................................................. 65 
Hall v. Road, 40 Mich. 46, 26 Am. Rep. 528 .............................................. 66 
Hayward v. Mason, 104 Pac. (Wash.) 139 .............................................. 59 
Hoyt v. Hart, 149 Cal. 722, 87 Pac. 569 .................................................... 64 
Hutton v. Hamboro, 1860 Surry Summer Assizes 175 Eng. Re-
ports 1031, 2 F&F, 218 ........................................................................ 63 
.Jenkins v. Depoyster, 299 Ky. 500, 186 S.W. (2d) 14, 15 .................... 61 
Joseph v. Ager, 41 Pac. (Gal.) 422 .......................................................... 42 
Kendall v. Hardy, 208 Mass. 20, 94 N.E. 254 .......................................... 63 
Kentucky etc. Power Co. v. Elkhorn City Land Co., 212 Ky. 624, 
279 s.w. 1082 ........................................................................................ 64 
Langazo v. San Joaquin Light & Power Co., 90 Pac. (2d) (DCA 
Cal.) 825 ................................................................................................ 65 
Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. First National Building Co., 89 Utah 
456, 57 Pac. (2d) 1099 .......................................................................... 67 
McCue v. Bellingham Bay Wa•ter Co., 5 Wash. 156; 31 Pac. 
461 ·········································································································· 38 
Mellon v. Vondor- Horst Bros., 44 Ut·ah 300; 144 Pac. 130, 136 ........ 118 
Metropolitan Works v. Metropolitan Railroad, LR 3 CP, 612, 624 .... 79 
Nielson v. Sandberg, 141 Pac. (2d) Utah 696, 701.. ............................ _ 60 
North Fork Water Company v. Edwards, et al., 54 Pac. (Cal.) 
69 ············································································································ 42 
Pasadena v. California Michigan Land & Water Co., 17 Cal. 
(2d) 616, 110 Pac. (2d) 983 ............................................................... G9 
Patterson Orchard Co. v. Southwest Arkansas Utilities Gorp., 
179 Ark. 1029, 18 SW (2d) 1028, 65 ALR 1446 ............................ 65 
People ex rcl Bryan v. Steele, 124 NYS 711, 713 .............................. 59 
Perley v. Cambridge, 220 Mass. 507, 108 N.E. 494 LRA 1915 E. 432 .. 63 
Pike v. Clark ct al., 95 Utah 235, 79 Pac. (2rl) 1010 ............................ 119 
INDEX OF GASES CITED-(Gontinued) 
Pioneer Irrigation District v. Smith, 285 Pac. (Idaho) 474 ................ 61 
Salina Creek Irrigation Go. v. Salina Stock Co., 7 Utah 456, 
27 Pac. 578, 579; Affirm. 163 U.S. 109, -U L. Ed 90, 16 S. 
Ct. 1036 .................................................................................................. 118 
Smi'th, et al. v. Rock Creek Water Corp. et al., 208 Pac. (2d) 
(DCA, Cal.) 705-707 .............................................................................. 41 
Stevens, et al. v. Bird, 81 Utah 355, 18 Pac. (2d) 292 ........................ 61 
Tripp v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 276 Pac. 913, 917 .................................... 117 
Vandalia R. Co. v. Clay County Home, 181 Ind. 704, 103 N.E. 1071.. 65 
Vandalia R. Go. v. Wheeler, 181 Ind. 424, 108 N.E. 1069 ................ 65 
West Coast Power Co. v. Buttram, 54 Idaho 318, 31 Pac. (2d) 687 .... 64 
Whittaker v. Ferguson, lG Utah 240, 51 Bac. 980 ................................ 117 
Winters v. Turner, 74 Utah 222, 278 Pac. 816 ........................................ 66 
INDEX OF TEXTS CITED 
Am. Jur.-Easements, Vol. 17, Sec. 97, p, 995 ........................................ 37 
Compiled Laws Utah, 1917, Sec. 6995 ...................................................... 119 
Corpus Juris, Vol. 19, Sec. 204, p. 968 ...................................................... 37 
Corpus Juris Secundum, Vol. 28, Sec. 91, p. 770 .................................... 63 
Gale on Easements, p. 237 .......................................................................... 42 
Gale on Easements, p. 343 .......................................................................... 63 
Lawyers Reports Annotated (NS) Vol. 15, p. 293 (Annotation) ........ 37 
McClintock on Equity, Sec. 140 .................................................................. 66 
Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. 5, Sec. 1966, p, 4468 ................ 66 
Thompson on Real Property, Vol. 1 (Perm. Ed.) Sec. 358, p. 578 .... 37 
Thompson on Real Property, Vol. 2 (Perm. Ed.) Sec. 578, p. 185 .... 59 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, Sec. 104-41-23 ............................................ 119 
Utah Constitution, Article VIII, Sec. 9 .................................................... 117 
Washburn on Real Property, p. 590 ........................................................ 79 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
a Municipal Gorpomtion, 
Plaintiff; 
-vs.-
J. B. and R. E. vVALKER, INC., 
a Corporation, 
Defendant, 




BRIEF OF DEFENDANT AND APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The plaintiff, a municipal corporation of 1the State 
of Utah, during the years of 1906 and 1907, <as part of 
the municipal water system, constructed and installed a 
1 
concrete conduit from the mouth of Big Co1t1tionwood 
Canyon, locaJted approximaiely 15 miles, southeast of the 
p~aintiff city, to the cHy, for the purpose of •transporting 
water from Big Cottonwood Canyon Creek to the munici-
pal area, for use by its inhabitants. The conduit is con-
iltructed of •concrete and has a measurement, at the 'Points 
involved in the present controversy, of approximately 
31;2 feet high hy 41j2 feet wide, outside measurements (R.-
SOO). It has a capacity of 70 cubic feet per se.cond of water. 
The conduit so constructed and installed traverses the 
SW 111, of the SW 1,-4 of SeCJtion 24, and the N\:V 111, of 
the NvV 111, of SeCJtion 25, Twp. 2 South, Range 1 East, 
Salt LHke Meridian. 
Prior to and during the construction of said conduit, 
the plaintiff acquired certain rights of way over 
the aforesaid quarter sections. These right •of way granis 
are evidenced by plaintiff's exhibits X andY which were 
admitted in evidence (R-546). The following is a true 
and correet copy of each of said exhibits: 
Plaintiff's E~hib~t X 
BARGAIN AND SALE DEED 
M.R.HAYNES 
-tiO-
SALT LAKE CITY, 
a Municipal Corpora-
tion. 
Recorded June 19, 1909 
at 9:07A.M. 
IN BOOK "7-J" of 
Deeds, page 558 
DATED ............... . 
CONS. $50.00 
One Witnes:s 
Ack'd. Aug. 2, 1907. 
CONVEYS: A perpetual right of way for 
a water condurt, said R1ight of way consisting of 
a strip of land 66 feet wide and 1322 feet long. 
The center longitudena.l line of s:aid right of way 
begins rut a point. South 89° 55' East 514 feet from 
the Northwest corner of Section 25, Township 2 
South, Range 1 East, Sa:lt Lake Base and Me6di-
an, thence along a 10° curve. R. (20' chords) 77 
f,eet to P. 'r. of same, thence North 20° 45' 280 
feet to P. C. 10° curve R., (20' chords) thence 
along s~aid curve 73 fee1t ~to P. R. C. 16° curve L. 
(20' chords) thence along sa;id curve 88 feet to 
P. '1'. of same, thence North 54° 48' W~est 30 feet, 
to P. C. 12° curve H. (20' chords) thence along 
s1aid curve ~JO feet to P. T. of same, thence North 
oo 48' West 18 feet to P. C. 10° curve L. (20' 
chords), thence along said curve 69 feet, toP. T. 
of same, thence North 35° 28' West 250 feet, to 
P. C. 8° curve R (20' chords) thence alrong s~aid 
curve 63 feet <to P. T. of same, thence North 10° 
08' \Vesrt 80 £ee1t toP. C. 16° curve L. (20' chords) 
thence along said curve 50 feet to P. R. C. 16° R. 
(20' chords) thence a~ong said ,curve 84 feet to 
P. R. C. 20° L. ( 20' chords) thence along said 
curve G2 feet to P. T. of s:ame, th:ence N:orth 44° 
44' W es't 8 feet to W esrt line of propei'ty, s'ame 
being North 0° 24' \Vest 1173 feet from the South-
west corner of Section 24, Township 2 South, 
Range 1 .FJast Salt Dake Base and Meridian. 
8. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit Y 
WARRANTY DEED 
UTAH LIGHT AND 
RAILROAD C 0 M-
PANY, a CJorpora.tion 
of UTAH (SEAL) 
By Joseph F. Smith, 
Ptresident, 
R. S. Campbell, 
Secretary. 
-to-
SALT LAKE CITY, a 
municipal coTpora-
tion. 
Recorded Dec. 26, 1905 
at M. 
IN BOOK "7-G" of 
Deeds, page s 23-6 
DATED ·Sept. 9, 1905 
CONS. 
Not Witnessed 
Ack'd. 0. K. 
CONVEYS: Beginning at ,corner No. 1, 
which bears Nor1th 40° 7' Wes't 1538.6 feet from 
the Southeast corner of Section 23, Township 2 
South, RJange 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridi-
•an, thence South 57° 24' \V e·st 275 feet, to corner 
No. 2, a tpoint in bed of Big Cottonwood Creek, 
thence North 32° 36' W es:t 792 fee1t, to corner No. 
3, thence North 57° 24' East 275 feet, to corner 
No. 4, thence South 32° 36' East 792 fee·t, to the 
plac.e of beginning, eontaining 5 acres, more or 
less. 
Also a right of way and easement for an 
rese:rv:oirs dams, ditches, conduiJt.s, pole lines and 
the appliances and utiliti:e·s ,conne·eted therewith to 
be constructed by the City, wherever these may 
be lo·CJate1d now or here after wi•thin }ands, owned 
4 
by the Utah Light and Railway Company particu-
larly within Sections 23, 26, and 25, Township 2 
South, Range 1 gast, Salt Lake Meridian also 
'al·l the water rights and power rights in Big 
Oottonwood Creek, West of the Ut,ah Power Com-
pany's tail race, owned by the Utah Light and 
Railway Company, including herein and particu-
larly meaning hereby the Desert Paper Mill, 
Wate·r power in said creek, the Granite Paper 
Mi~lwater power in said creek and the Butler 
Mill wate·r power rthe latter being located right 
at rthe mouth of Big Cottonwood Canyon, and 
t:he two former ahout a mile and ahout 2 miles 
respectively below the mouth of said Oanyon, it 
being <t:he intention of ffllis agreement that the 
Utah Light and Railway Company relinquish and 
rerlease all its r~ight in and to the waters. of Big 
Cottonwood Creek for power purposes or O'ther-
wise below the power house of the Utah Power 
Company near :the mouth of Big Cortt;onwood 
Canyon, provided however th1at the dams for 
diverting 't11e wwter from the Creek into the City's 
proposed conduit shali not he located eas't of the 
City's present weir 'and tl1e hottom of the pro-
posed conclui t s!haH not be higher than 28 feet 
belrow 'the floor of the UtaJJ. Power Company's 
. power house, so that said Utah Light and Rail-
way .can build a reservoir for regulation purposes 
o.f not leS'S tiJ.'an one million cubic feet capacity 
between the tail race of said power house and 
the said weir. 
These deeds were executed by the then fee-simple 
owners ,of the land over whi~h ·the said rights of way 
were granted. The said conduit was put into 'opemtion 
·and use in ·the year 1907 (R,;-454) and has been in con-
tinuous operation ·and use since said date. This con-
duit conducts a substantial part ·of ·the culinary water 
used and consum:ed by the inh'ahi,tants of the city. 
The defendant ,corpora:tion was in posses'sion of 
I 
certain par,ts of the above mentioned and described 
quarter sections of land adja.cent tn s1aid CIOnduit at the 
time of fh:e commencemen't of ·this ac,tion, and for ·about 
two yelars prior thereto, under an arrangement with the 
owner thereof not relevant to this controversy. (Defend-
•ant's Ex. 47, R-826.) 
In Augus't 1946 :the defendant commenced the 
erection a.nd con!struction of an extensive plant for the 
production of sand and gmvel from the land whieh was 
in its posses,si'on (R-769). 'This p[ant ,consists of an 
elaborate system of elevated conveyors 'and appam:tus 
for crushing the raw materia:! and ela.ssifying tlhe same 
for use in the commercial production •of concrete and 
road base aggregate. The type and extent of the pl'ant 
is shown :on numerous ph01tographs introduced in evi-
denc:e which are a part of ·this record. Reference is made 
to plaintiff's exhibits A t·o I (R-149, 150), rand defend-
ant's exhibits 1 (R.-785), 2 (R-781), 19 (R-783) for a 
visualization of the defendant's pl1ant. The defendant 
began actual operation of i1ts plant some time in the 
early summer of 1948, and eontinued the operations to 
the date of the commen,cement ·of t:his ~action and during 
it•s pendency. 
Plaintiff's conduit was in use and opemtion at the 
'time the defendant cons'tructed its plant and pJaced the 
same in operation. It is manifest from the records that 
the present nwner in fee-'simp~e of 'the· land upon which 
defendant conducts its operations, acquired title 'to the 
lands burdened by the right of way gr1ant1s in favor of 
t'he city (Plaintiff',s J1Jxs. X andY, supm.). The defend-
ant has conducted and conducts i'ts operations with full 
knowledge of exis'te~ce of s~aid conduit. 
Part of defendant's operations consists of removing 
sorl, 'Sa.nd and gravel from its deposrts on the hiHs,ides 
below plaintiff's conduit. (Pl1aintiff's Exs. A to I, supra; 
Exs. J, K, L, M (R~163, 180) ; Ex. V (R-348) ; Defend-
ant's Exs. 23 (R-552), 24 (~556), 25 (R-558), 26 (R-
560), (R-777, 779), 1 2 19, 'supra). Tlhe removal of 
material from the hillside is effected by the use of bull-
dozers, (R~777), which pus:h the material from places of 
naturall deposition to a "grizzly" or "'trap" which is 
located a.t a point near ·th:e, e'ast line of Wasatch Boule-
vard. This material then enters a tunnel constructed 
under the surface of Wasatch Boulevard through whieih 
is operated a moving belt upon which the material is 
conVIeyed through the tunnel to the crusher whi,ch is 
located on the hillside immedi'ately west of Was•atch 
Boulevard (R-851, 852). 
Wasatch Boulevard is a public county road which 
was consltructed by 8a'lt Lakte County as a "make work 
project" after H1e close of World War I, in the years of 
1918 and 1919 (R-704). The road exten1ds alo'llg the 
slope of tJJe Wasa.t0h Mountains and was origina:lly 
designated as W:as~a~cn-Honneville Highway. It is now 
known as Wa.satcJh Boulevard (R-688). As first con-
strncrted it wa1s nothing more than a dirt roa!d. It wa.s 
located on the hHil-side 'below plaintiff's conduit. The 
numerous exhibits in this cruse indicate the general 
7 . 
position and direction of this ro'ad, but ruttenltion is 
particular'ly invited to p[aintiff's 1exhibit J, supra, and 
defendant'·s exhibit 39 (R-690) and exhibit 47, supra, 
for an accurate understanding of the location of this 
pu blie road. 
In March, 1948, Salt Lake County propo'sed to 
improve and develop Wasatch Boulevard from East 33rd 
'South Street (R-691), southea:st1e•r'ly to the mouth of 
Big Cottonwood Canyon (R-690). This project was 
approved by the Utah State Ro,ad Commission and 
surveys were immediately ,commenced (R-687, 690). The 
improvement intended by the County contemplated a 
widening of that part of ·wasatch Boulevard where it 
passes through the land o.f which defendant is in posses-
sion particularly in the area which defendant was exca-
vating an'd in whieh it also was conducting its processing 
ope·rati:ons (Defendant's Ex. 39 R-692). To accomplish 
that purpose the County proposed to acquire from the 
owner of the land upon which is located defendant's 
workings, an addition'al right of way of about 50 feet 
in width (R-707). In making the road adjustment it 
was and is necMsary for the county to cut into the hill-
side below plaintiff's conduit, and change the slopes 
thereof consistent wilth what is considered safe engineer-
ing technique (R-706, 707, 708, 710, 711, 713; Defendant's 
Exs. 39, 40 41 ·supra). The County at the time of con-
templating these improvements was immediately con-
cerned with 'the safety of plaintiff's conduit which was 
located on :the hillside above the parts of the road which 
the county intended to improve (R-717). 
On April 22, 1949, the plaintiff commenced this 
action against defendant, seeking to restrain its opera-
tions. Briefly summariz.ed ·the complaint alleges that 
defendant's operations as heretofore conducted con-
stitute a serious menace and threat to the safety of 
plaintiff's conduit by virtue of the fact that defendant 
in removing material from the hillside below the ·conduit, 
was also removing support of the conduit to which the 
plaintiff was entitled. Plaintiff sought an injunction 
against the defendant whic!h would prohibit 1defendant 
from making any fnr1bher excavations on the moun'tain-
side be1ow JYlaintiff's conduit and right of way, and a 
mandatory injunction requiring defendant to restore 
the natural slope of the mountainside by filling in the 
excavations already made and otherwise restoring 't.he 
natural slope of the mountainside to a condition that 
existed prior to the time defendant made such excava-
tions. 
The defendant's answer consists of general denials 
of the allegations of the complaint, except defendant 
admitted paragr'aph 2 of the complaint which contains 
an averment that plaintiff's right of way over and across. 
Section 25 aforesaid is 66 feet in width, and that said 
conduit is located in the center of the right of way. 
The court permitted the defendant to submit an 
amendment to paragraph 2 of its answer. Thereupon 
defendant proposed an amendment whereby it admitted 
eUJch and every allegation contained in paragraph 2 of 
plaintiff',s complaint, except 'the defendant denied that 
the right of wa.y owned and held by plaintiff over and 
across Section 25 aforesaid, is 66 feet in width and also 
9 
denied that plaintiff's conduit is cons'trurcted and in-
's'talled along 'the center of said right of way as same 
crosses Sections 24 and 25 (R-62). By minute order 
dated August 27, 1949, the court authorized defendant 
to amend its answer with respect to paragraph 2 'thereof 
whereby defendant spedfically denied !flrat plaintiff's 
right of way is 66 feet wide over and a~cros's said Section 
25, hut the 
1
court refused to allow defendant to file that 
part of the defendant's proposed amendmen't whereby 
defendant denied tha:t plaintiff's conduit is constructed 
and installed along the center of said right of way (R-
63, 64). 
Salt La:ke County, in view of the contemplated 
improvements of ·wasatch Boulevard above described, 
was permitted by the court tt:o intervene in tlhe action, 
by order made, entered and filed on June 14, 1949 (R-147, 
148). Thereupon the County filed its complaint and 
answer in intervention. The intervenor asked the court 
to determine the right, if any, of the plaintiff to have 
the mountainsi~de which lie·s within the limits of Hie inter-
venor's right of way and roadway, remain in its then 
present condition, and further, ifflle county prayed for 
the court to determine what, if any, artif~cial support 
tJhe in'tervenor wou~d be required to provide and estab-
Hsh if the necessary excavation and removal of material 
to wilden and improve intervenor's roadway were made. 
Couns,el for the intervenor ~actively participa:ted in the 
ensuing trial. 
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The trial consumed many days and there were 
in'troduced in evidence by all of the parties a great 
number of exhibit·s which have been made a part of the 
record of trial. The lega!l, geological and engineering 
problems involved were, and are complex. The ·trial 
court finaHy on September 1, 1949, made, entered and 
filed its findings of fact and co:nplusions of law and 
judgment (R-65, 82). Because of the difficult and com-
plicated is,sues involved in the a:ction and the assign-
ments of error on this appeal, the appellant believ;es 
that the eourt is entitled to have the findings, conclu-
sions, and judgment, presented in this brief, and it there-
fore sets forth the same with only such abbreviations and 
elimina~tions as pertain ·to formal matters. The foUowing 
are true copies of the same : 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That plaintiff is, and at all times ·hereinafter 
mentioned was, a municipal corporation organized and 
existing under the laws of the Sta:te of Utah. That 
defendant is now, and at aH times hereinafter mentioned 
was, a co·rporation organized and existing under the 
laws of the S'tate of Utah. That the intervenor, Salt 
Lake County, is, and at a:ll times hereinafter mentioned 
was, a political subdivision of the State of Utah. 
2. That paaintiff, for more ·than fifty years last 
past, lras been, and is now, engaged in supplying to its 
inhabitants water for ,culinary, domestic, manufacturing, 
I 
lawn sprinkling and other beneficial purposes, and owns 
and controls the only system for supplying water to its 
inhabitants. Tha·t in the years 1906 and 1907, as part of 
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its water system, the plaintiff constructed and installed 
a concrete conduit from the mouth of Big Cottonwood 
Canyon, located approximately fifte,en miles south and 
ea;st of plaintiff city, to plain'tiff city for the purpose of 
bringing the water flowing in the Big Cottonwood 
Canyon Creek rto the p1aintiff city for use by its inhabi-
tants, sai'd conduit being 3% feet high by 4lj2 feet wide 
outside measurements at the point where defendant has 
excavated, as hereinafter found, and carrying 70 cubic 
feet per se,cond of water. r:Pha:t said conduit, so con-
structed and installed, traverses the S. vV. 14 of the S. vV. 
14 of Section 24, and the N. Vv. % of the N. vV. 14 of 
Section 25, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, in Salt 
Lake County, Utah, and is constructed and installed 
along the cenler of a right of way GG feet wide, which 
right of way is necessary and is pos::;es'sed and owned 
and held by plaintiff across the S. vV. % of the S. W. 
% of said Section 24 and the N. vV. 14 of the N. W. % 
of said Section 25, provided, however, in view of the 
fact that defendant ha,s moved to amend paragraph 2 
of its answer in order to deny the alleged 66 foot width 
of plaintiff's right of wny in said Section 25, and to 
reopen the case for the introduction of evidence on said 
subje,ct, and the court having granted the above des-
cribed portion of said motion, this finding may be altered 
subsequently by the court as to the width of plaintiff's 
right of way in said Section 25 and all matters neces-
sanly pertaining thereto in the li'indings of Fact, Con-
cluiions of Law and Decree entered herein. That the 
conduit fnU of water has not added any weight to the 
land o0eupied by it; that it is of less weighl than the 
material removed for its installation, that the conduit 
followed the contour of the hill, crossing the spufis in 
trenches and the ravines in shallow treneihes or in fiUs, 
that the conduit wa.s ma:de of 
1
cement, poured in forms, 
that the conduit as constructed is not adequate to 'SUpport 
the water pressure from within the conduit without the 
support of earthen embankment on its: sides. 
3. That in the year 1931 the plaintiff also con-
structed a conduit from Little Cottonwood Canyon to 
the said Big Cot,tonwood conduit. That said Little 
Cottonwood conduit connects with said Big Cottonwood 
conduit at a point immediately east of the place where 
the defendant has made, and is making, excavations, as 
hereinafter found. That the water carried in said conduit 
below the junction between the said Big Cottonwood and 
Little Cottonwood conduits, and at the place where de-
fendant has been and is excavating as hereinafter found, 
in the year 1948 comprised fifty-four per cent of the 
total water supplied by plaintiff to its inhalbitants. 
4. That said right of way across said Section 24 
and 25, above referred to, is situated on a slope. That 
the surf·ace of said sl·ope, in its natural condition, was 
compo·sed of e'ar'th and coar'ser ma:teria:l so integrated and 
consolidated, and so covered with grasses, herbs, bushes 
and otlher natural growth, as to form a shield to such 
erosion and 'subsi1dence as would occur from t:he ordinarv 
and usual forces of nature, and so long as such surface 
dO'Wll the s'lope from said ri~ht of way of the pilaintiff 
remained undisturbed and in its natural condition the 
same afforded, and would continue to afford, sufficient 
support to said right of way. 
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5. That during the year 1948 the defendant con-
structed and installed certain machinery and equipment 
at the foot of s-aid slope qelow plaintiff's said right of 
way for the purpose of taking from said slope the sand 
and gravel contained therein. That in 1948 defendant 
proceeded to excavate said slope bellow plaintiff's said 
right of way and has continued, and does now continue, 
to take out an:d haul away great quantities of earth, sand 
and grave'l from said slope. 1'hat the operations of the 
defendant in removing the earth, sand and gravel have 
been so conducted that defendant has left pits, scarps 
and openings in the slope below said corrdui t which pene-
trate a pitCJh of 2 feet horizontal to 1 foot vertical; that 
nearly perpendieu1ar banks have been created and left, 
one of which is within GO feet of the plaintiff's conduit; 
that such pits, scarps, openings and banks so made by 
defondant will, by natural erosion, recede up the slope 
toward plaintiff's right of way and conduit and will 
remove the protective embankment and the footings sup-
porting plaintiff's conduit and wil1 cause the said conduit 
I 
to be undermined and to break and fall from it's present 
position. 
6. That it is not possible to foretell the exact time 
when suCJh undermining and breaking of said conduit will 
take place; 'that the same may occur within a very short 
time depending upon the amount of rainfall, the severity 
of storms and the forces of nature brougq1t to bear upon 
1Jhis particular area. That i't is impossible to be prepared 
with the proper preeantions to prevent the undermining 
and breaking of said conduit, if snid exeavations of the 
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defendant are permitted to remain and continued exca-
vations are made. That there is imminent danger to said 
conduit from the past, present and contemplated gravel 
operations of 'the defendant. That the dama~e to plain-
tiff whi,ch will result should said right of way and conduit 
I 
be undermined and the support thereto be withdrawn 
will be extremely great and will be irreparable, and the 
destruction of said conduit will result in a loss to plain-
tiff and to its inhabitants of a major and extremely vital 
source of water supply. That without such 'source of 
water supply plaintiff will be unable to furnish water to 
a large part of its inhabitants. 
7. That in its gravel removing operations the 
defendant has removed gravel, top-soil, shrubs, grass and 
other vegetation from within the outer 33 feet of the 
right of way of the plaintiff to a point within 8 feet of 
the ecnter of plaintiff's condl'it and for a distance of 
about 94 feet along said conduit to an average depth of 
12 inches, thus steepening the slope of the surface of 
the right of way and exposing the surface to erosive 
elements and rendering the same more readily subject to 
erosion and adding to the danger and peril of plaintiff's 
conduit. 
8. That on the side nearest the Wasatch Boulevard 
a berm of tlhe natural, original s'lope for a distance of 
8 feet out from tihe ,cen'ter of plaintiff's said conduit i'S 
necessary for the safety of said conduit and a berm on 
the side near.est the 1Vasatch Boulevard of 33 feet from 
the center of plaintiff's conduit is nece·ssary for a right 
should not be impaired in any manner by defendant or 
intervenor. 
9. That defendant's gravel operations and the 
plaintiff's said conduit in said Sections 24, and 25 are 
both on a deposit of gravel containing some cementation 
and a degree of stability and compactness; but, nev,erthe-
less, the court finds 'that the materials of said gravel 
deposit have such lack of stability that a slope of 1lj2 
fee't horizontal to 1 foot vertical is required to safely 
support said conduit, provided it is protected by its 
natural mantle of shrubs, vegetation and rocks, and when 
so protected the court finds such slope to be a slope of 
safety for 'Said conduit. 'Dhe court further finds that a 
denuded slope of 1lj2 feet horizontal to 1 foot vertical, 
that is to say, a slope denuded of its natural mantle of 
shrubs, vegetation and rocks, is not a slope of safety 
but is one which will endanger plaintiff's said conduit 
by increased erosion at ni,ck points on slopes and from 
heavy rainfalls on smooth 'slopes. 
10. That the operations of the defendant as they 
lmve been carried on have already started erosive action 
that endangers said conduit. That the natural mantle of 
shrubs, vegetation and rocks on the slope below plain-
tiff's conduit at the area of defendant's workings has 
been removed by defendant in its operations and so 
defendant has left a slope or slopes denuded of such 
natural mantle and therefore more sl1h;ject to the ,erosive 
forces. The court finds that there is not enough cementa-
tion and compactness in the said gravel deposit -.vhich 
defendant is working below plaintiff's conduit to fnrnish 
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a slope of safety for said conduit in such denuded con-
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dition and to protect said conduit at a slope less than 
2 feet horizontal to 1 foot vertical, and the court finds 
that a denuded slope of 2 feet horizontal to 1 foot vertical 
constitutes a slope of safety for said conduit, provided 
no penetration is made below the slope of safety for 
said conduit as found in this paragraph. 
11. 'l'hat intervenor contemplates, and is in the 
process of accomplishing, the widening and improving of 
a County 'highway known as the ·wasatch Boulevard a~t 
the place ·where defendant is taking the sand and gravel 
material from said 'slope 'below plaintiff's conduit. That 
intervenor has a present right of way for a roadway 60 
feet in width and to use such width and to widen said 
roadway it w1ll be necessary for intervenor to excavate 
and remove part of the slope wl1ic21 lies immediately 
easterly of the portion of said rigllt of way now used as 
a roadway known as the \Vasatch Boulevard. rlwt iuter-
venor's riglJt of way is subsequent in title and 1·ig11t to 
plaintiff's right of way for its said conduit and any 
excavations macle or to be made by inten,enor in said 
slope will be subject to plaintiff's right to have its right 
of way nnu condnit properly and adequately supported 
by said slope. That the contemplated widening and im-
proving of vVasatch Boulevard by intervenor will result 
in increased erosion to that portion of the slope above 
the excavations made and to be made by intervenor and 
below plaintiff's conduit by creating rec,eding nick 
points and will contribute to the danger of plaintiff's 
conduit and right of way through erosive forces. 
12. That to give proper and adequate security to 
Plaintiff's right of way for sai1d conduit requires a slope 
of not less than 1 foot horizontal to 1 foot vertical at 
the outer edge of said right of way, which is closer to 
Wasatch Boulevard, which said slope, beginning at such 
outer edge, is herein designated as the riglht of way slope 
as distinguished from the slope which the court has re-
ferred to herein as the slope of safety for said conduit. 
But such slope of 1 foot horizontal to 1 foot vertical is 
hereby found to be a slope of safety for said right of 
way only when it is protected ~by a mantle of shrubs and 
vegetation after proper dressing to remove protruding 
boulders and filling in the holes, swales and other depres-
sions and making a uniform smooth slope. 
13. T1hat in al'l insta~ces of the slopes here involved 
where the natural surface prote·cting mantle of shrubs, 
vegetation and rocks has been or will be removed and 
where the pitch of 2 to 1 right of way slope is penetrated 
th court finds that to establish slopes of safety they 
must be dressed by being made uniform in slope from 
top to bottom, by removing protruding rocks and boulders 
and by filling in holes, swales and other indentations and 
leaving a smooth surface. 
14. The court in these findings has distinguished 
between a slope of safety for the plaintiff's right of way 
and a slope of saf.ety for plaintiff's conduit on said right 
of way. The court finds that to maintain a slope of 
safety for said right of way such slope shoul:d commence 
at the outer edge of said right of way, which outer edge 
in the ground is perpendicularly be'low a. point 33 feet on 
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a horizontal plane out from and at right angles to tihe 
center line of plaintiff's ,conduit, and go down the slope 
from that point to the point where it intersects the more 
gentle slope of the slope of safety for sai1d conduit; tlhat 
to maintain a slope of safety for said conduit such slope 
should commence at a point 2 feet verti0ally above the 
outer, upper corner of the conduit, which is the upper 
corner closest to the \Vasateh Bouleval'd, sucJh slope to 
continue downward until it re~ches said Wasatch Boule-
vard; that the slope of safety required for srai'd right of 
way is steeper in terms of horizontal to vertical measure-
ments, or the degree of slope, than that required for the 
slope of safety for said conduit, the two slopes, however, 
having their commencement point at different points 'aS 
hereinabove indicated, provided, 'however, the court finds 
that where the existing slopes below plaintiff's right of 
way are not now disturbed by defendant's workings, and 
such slopes have a pitch steeper than 2 feet horizontarl 
to 1 foot vertical, su0h slopes, witlh their natural mantle 
of vegetation and rock as presently existing, are found 
by the court to be slopes of safety to plaintiff's conduit 
and right of way so far ~s defendant's or intervenor's 
responsibility for the safety of said conduit is ~oncerned. 
I 
That where such steeper than 2 feet to 1 foot slopes on 
their downward course from plaintiff's said conduit 
meet a less ·steep but uni:form slope below and 'such 
steeper slope is uniform and continuous in pitch for a 
slope dis'tanee of at least 50 feet between the said point 
"X" on Exhibit "A" above the conduit and s1aid gentler 
slope, the court finds that a continuation of such steeper 
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slope at the same pi tcih of said slope existing above said 
more gentle slope into and beyond said gentler slope 
will provi'de a slope of safety for plaintiff's conduit and 
right of way, provided such continued 'slope is dressed 
and provided vvith a growth of vegetation comparable 
to the vegetation on the slope above of which it is a 
continuation. 
15. That as applied to defendant's sand and gravel 
workings and the intervenor's widening of said ~Wasatch 
Boulevard and the material in said slopes that may there-
by be removed by defendant and intervenor the court 
finds 'that in such removal of material the various slopes 
of safety to plaintiff's right of way and conduit will be 
as follows: 
(a) A slope of 2 feet horizontal to 1 foot vertical 
beginning at the said outer edge, or edge nearest the 
vVasa:tch Boulevard, of the plaintiff's right of way, and 
extending down to the ~Wasatch Boulevard at a uniform 
slope, is a slope of safety for the plaintiff's right of way, 
though such slope is denuded of its natural mantle of 
shrubs, vegetation and rocks. The material demonstrated 
in area A, B, G of Exhibit "A" may be removed. 
(b) A slope of 2 feet horizontal to 1 foot vertical 
beginning at a point 2 f<~et vertically above the upper, 
outer edge of the conduit and extending downward to tho 
\Vasatch Boulevard at a uniform slope is a slope of 
sa.fety for said conduit, though snch slope is denuded of 
its natural mantle of shrubs, vegetation and rocks, hut 
to proteet plaintiff's said right of way defendant and 
intervenor may not remove the material and create and 
le'ave such 2 to 1 surface slope beyond a point up the 
hillside where such 2 to 1 slope will be intersected by a 
1 to 1 slope coming down the hillside and beginning at 
the outer edge of plaintiff's right of way, such outer 
edge being 33 feet out horizontally from the center of 
plaintiff's conduit as demonstrated by line B-C on 
Exhibit "A", such 1 to 1 slope to be dressed evenly in a 
workman like manner and planted to shrubs and vegeta-
tion consisting of either sumac, oak or other native 
shrubs and trimmed and rounded a~t the top by defendant 
or intervenor, whichever removes the material. The 
material may be removed so as to leave such 'slopes so 
dressed, planted, trimmed and rounded. The material 
demonstrated in area G-B-E-F of Exhibit "A" may he 
removed, provided the right of way slope B-E is left, 
dressed, planted, trimmed and rounded. Nothing in these 
findings shall be intended or construed to require the 
defendant or intervenor to establish the slope demon-
strated by line C-B-X in Exhibit "A" Where such slope 
did not exist on the slope January 1, 1949. 
(e) A slope of 11;2 feet horizontal to 1 foot vertical, 
beginning at a point 2 feet vertically above the upper, 
outer edge of the eonduit and extending downward to the 
'Vasatch Boulevard at a uniform slope, is a slope of 
safety for said conduit provided such slope is dressed 
and is planted with shrubs and vegetation, but the defend-
ant and intervenor may not remove the material and 
create and leave such 11;2 to 1 surface slope beyond a 
point up the hillside where such 11;2 to 1 slope will be 
intersected by a 1 to 1 slope coming down the hillside, 
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beginning at the said outer edge of plaintiff's right of 
way, as demonstrated by line B-C on Exhibit" A", such 
1 to 1 slopes to be dressed evenly in a workmanlike man-
ner and planted to shrubs and vegetation consisting of 
either sumac, oak or other native shrubs and trimmed 
and rounded a:t the top by the defendant or intervenor, 
whichever removes the material. The material demon-
strated in area F-E-C-D on Exhibit ''A'' may be removed 
provided the slopes left are dres,sed, planted, trimmed 
and rounded as aforesaid. 
(d) No material may be removed that will leave 
slopes steeper than 'that permitted under sub-paragraph 
(c) hereof. 
16. The slopes of safety and the materials that 
defendant or intervenor may remove from the slope 
below plaintiff's right of way and conduit as found in 
paragraph 15 are shown graphically upon the following 
illustrative drawing hereto attached marked Exhibit 
"A" and hereby made a part of these findings and the 
decree herein entered. 
17. \Vhenever in 't'liese findings the court has 
referred to the outer edge of plaintiff's right of way as 
being 33 feet from the center of plaintiff's conduit such 
3:3 feet is to be measured on a horizontal plane at right 
angles to and from the center line of said conduit. 
18. That the defendant is the owner and in posses-
sion o'f the S. \V. 14 of the S. W. 74 of Section 24 and 
the N. W. :14 of the N. \V. 14 of Section 25, Township 2 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian in 
Salt Lake Colmty and other lands adjacent thereto but 
defendant's ownership of said lands is suhject to plain-
tiff'·s said right of way for its said conduit over said 
lands, which said right of way has been a matter of 
record in the office of the County Hecorder of Salt Lake 
since the year 1D05 as to a part of said right of way and 
the year 1909 a,s to the rest of said right of way, which 
years are prior to the time when defendant acquired 
title to said lands; the ownership of defendant to said 
lands is further subject to the intervenor's said right of 
way for said Wasatch Boulevard. 
19. That the defendant intends to continue taking 
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the earth, sand and gravel from said hillside below plain-
tiff's said conduit and such continued operations, unless 
restrained within the limits of safety prescribed by the 
court, will endanger and imperil pJaintiff's said right 
of way and conduit. That plaintiff has not a speedy or 
adequate remedy in the due court of law and will suffer 
great and irreparable injury and damage unless equity 
interposes and grants equitable relief by restraining and 
enjoining defendant and intervenor from making exca-
vations in said slopes below plaintiff's said right of 
way and conduit except as required and permitted under 
the decree of this court to be made herein. 
20. The court makes no findings concerning the 
right of way on the side of the ·conduit farthest from 
the Wasatch Boulevard. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact the court now 
makes and enters its Conclusion of Law. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Tha:t the defendant and the intervenor cannot 
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use their respective land and right of way in such a 
manner as to interfere with the plaintiff's right of way 
or its said conduit; 
2. That the defendant and intervenor cannot use 
their respective land and right of way so as to sub-
stantially increase the cost of maintenance of the right 
of way for the conduit owned by plaintiff; 
3. rrhat the gravel operations of the defendant cor-
poration and the proposed improvement to Wasatch 
Boulevard, by the intervenor constitute an imminent 
danger to the water conduit of the plaintiff; 
4. That the court, by injunction, should protect the 
plaintiff from erosive dangers set in motion by the de-
fendant and the intervenor; 
5. That the defendant and the intervenor cannot 
use their respective land and right of way in such a man-
ner as to cause any part of the right of way for the con-
duit to fall away, subside or be subject to increased 
erosion; 
6. That the removal of gravel, top-soil and shrubs 
in the right of way for the 'COnduit, by the defendant, 
constitutes an invasion of plaintiff's rights under the 
right of way, and is inconsistent with t:he grant of the 
right of way to the plaintiff; 
7. That on this deposit of gravel the conduit of the 
plaintiff will be endangered hy removal of materials 
below it that will result in a slope steeper than the slopes 
of safety as defined herein; 
8. That the right of way of the Ci'ty will be en-
croached upon by any slope steeper than a right of way 
slope of one to one; 
9. That there are numerous methods of protecting 
the plaintiff's conduit; by retaining walls, lowering the 
conduit, installing a better conduit, placing other types 
of footings for said conduit, etc., but no other method, 
other than slope protection, is involved in the pleadings 
before the court; 
10. That the court should make adequate orders 
and decrees to insure slope protection to the conduit. 
11. The foregoing conclusions of law apply· only 
to the side of plaintiff's condu~t nearest to the ·wasatch 
Boulevard. 
12. 'l'hat tho decree made herein may be subse-
quently modified by the consideration of other proposed 
methods of protecting plaintiff's conduit; 
13. The court should retain juri'Sdiction to be 
exercised on petition, on notice to be fixed by the court, 
for the protection of the said conduit. 
That judgment be entered accordingly. 
Dated this 1st day of September, 1949. 
JUDGMENT 
NOvV THEREFORE, upon motion of plaintiff's 
said counsel, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED that plaintiff have judgment against the 
defendant J. B. & R. E. WALKER, INC. and intervenor 
Salt Lake County as follows: 
1. That the defendant immediately cease and desist 
from removing soil or rocks from the surface of plain-
tiff's right of way as it crosses defendant's land, being 
a right of \vay 33 feet \vide on the lower side closer to 
\Vasatch Boulevard from the center line of plaintiff's 
:-::: 
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Big Cottonwood conduit as constructed upon the land, 
said 33 feet to be mea,sured in a horizontal plane at 
right angles to the center line of said conduit. 
2. That defendant J. B. and R E. Walker, Inc. on 
or before October 31, 1949, restore rthe surface of plain-
tiff's right of way at the place where such surface ha:s 
been distrubed by said defendant as found by the court 
by filling in earth material and top-soil to an average 
depth of 12 inches, and that said defendant, on or before 
the 31st day of December, 1949, at such time as weather 
and planting conditions are favorable, plant :shrubs con-
sisting of either sumac, oak or other native shrubs in 
such numbers as will give a growth of shrubs and brush 
of like density as prevails on natural slopes in the 
inm1ediate vicinity of such restored area where shrubs 
and brush are now growing. 
3. That the defendant and the intervenor are, and 
each of them is, hereby enjoined and restrained from 
moving earth, sand, gravel, rocks or other material from 
the slope below plaintiff's said right of way and conduit 
as the same crosses Sections 24 and 25 in Township 2 
South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, 
which removal will disturb the slope below plaintiff's 
said right of way and conduit by increasing the pi trh 
of the slope to a steeper uniform slope than a slope 
measuring 2 feet horizontal to 1 foot vertical below said 
right of way, beginning at the outer edge of said right 
of way and sloping downward to the vVasa tch Boulevard, 
which outer edge of said right of way on the ground is 
perpendicularly below a point 33 feet on a horizontal 
plane out from and at right angles to the center line of 
plaintiff's conduit; that defendant J. B. and R. E. 
Walker, Inc. be, and it hereby is, ordered and required 
to fill in such earth material as shall be required to 
create and leave such uniform slope of 2 feet horizontal 
to 1 foot vertical from .said outer edge of plaintiff's said 
right of way downward to the Wasateh Boulevard, such 
work to he completed no later than October 31, 1949. 
"1. As an alternative to complying with the require.:. 
ments specified in paragraph 3 hereof, the defendant and 
intervenor may remove earth, sand, gravel, ro,ck and 
other material from said mountain side and create and 
leave slopes steeper than one measuring 2 feet horizontal 
to 1 foot vertical within the following limitations: 
(a) Defendant and intervenor may remove 1the 
material so as to leave the slopes described in sub-
paragraph (b) of paragraph 15 of the court's Findings 
of Fact subject to the conditions as to dressing, trim-
ming, rounding and planting orf shrubs and vegetation 
therein specified; the material removable hereunder be-
ing the area shown in the· illustration referred to in 
paragraph 1G of the court's Findings marked Exhibit 
"A" nnd made a part ofthis clc.cree, .1s tl:e area G-D-E-F. 
(b) . Defendant and intervenor may remove ma~erin1 
so as to leave the slopes described in sub-paragraph (c) 
of paragraph 15 of the court's Findings of Fact, subject 
to the conditions as to dressing, trimming, rounding and 
planting of shrubs and vegetation therein ::;pecified; the 
material removable hereunder being the area .shown in 
the illustration referred to. in 1)aragraph 16 of the court--'s 
Findings of Fact marked E:rllibit "A" and made a part 
of this decree as the area F-E-C-D ; the party removing 
any of such material is hereby ordered to trim and round 
the top of said slope and dress the slope evenly and 
plant shrubs and vegetation, all of which said work must 
be done in a workmanlike manner. 
(c) It is further decreed that the shrubs required 
by any tenns of paragraph 4 of this decree to be planted 
shall be such shrubs as sumac, oak or other native shrubs 
whi~h shall be planted sufficiently dense to provide a 
covering of comparable density to the natural growth 
on slopes in the immediate vicinity of defendant's gravel 
pit now containing such growth and shall be planted in 
such a manner and at such a time ithat they will take 
root and grow, such planting to be no less than one year 
after beginning the removal of the material in the hill-
side to the pitch permitted under paragraph 4 of this 
decree. 
(d) It is further decreed that sufficient top-soil 
be replaced upon the slopes required under paragraph 
4 of this decree to be planted in shrubs, and vegetation 
to provide such shrubs and vegetation with reasonably 
good soil, such restoration of top-soil and planting of 
shrubs and vegetation being a part O'f the dressing of 
slopes required under said paragraph 4 to be dressed. 
(e) It is further decreed that no part of the area 
illustrated in paragraph 16 of the court's Findings of 
Fact shown on Exhibit ''A'' and hereby made a part of 
this decree, as the area D-C-E-B-X-Y, shall in any man-
ner be disturbed, and the defendant and intervenor are 
hereby enjoined and restrained from in any manner dis-
turbing the same or taking mate-rial of any kind there-
from. 
(f) lt is further de.creed rthat all requirements for 
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slopes left steeper than the 2 feet to 1 foot slope provided 
for in paragraph 3 of this decree and permitted under 
paragraph 4 of this decree shall be· performed and com-
pleted within one year from the disturbance of said 2 to 
1 slope, or in lieu thereof that a bond guaranteeing said 
provisions approved by the court as to form and amount 
by filing within said year in a sum no less than$10,000.00. 
(g) lt is further orde-red and decreed tha:t nothing 
in the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and in this decree shall require the defendant or inter-
venor to establish the pitch demonstrated by line C-B-X 
of Exhibit "A" where ·such pitch did not exist on Janu-
ary 1, 1948. 
5. ln addition to the earth materials tha:t defen-
dant may remove as provided elsewhere in this decree, 
where the natura1 slopes as they existed on January 1st, 
1948, and where they had not been altered by man, ex-
isted at a pitch steeper than two feet horizontal to one 
foot vertical, and where said slopes with a pit~h srteepe-r 
than two to one as aforesaid continue doWnward until 
they meet a gentler slope and where a said steeper slope 
a:bove said gentler slope has an average uniform and con-
tinuous pitch of at least fifty feet between point "X" on 
FJxhibit "A" above fhe said conduit and a gentler slope, 
the defendant or intervenor is not prohibited from 
removing earth materials from t.l1e said gentler slope, 
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provided that tJhe area drsturbed is dressed by the party 
disturbing the same and provided by said party with a 
growth of vegetation comparable to the vegetation on the 
slope and above said disturbed area, within one year 
from the commeneement of the disturbance of said slope. 
Defendant and intervenor are enjoined from creating, in 
the removal of the material described in this paragraph 
of this decree, a pitch steeper than the said average 
pitch of at least flrfty feet down from point "X" above 
the conduit in the said area distur'bed. 
6. Defendant is granted the rig•ht to amend para-
graph 2 of defendant's answer by denying that the right 
of way for the plaintiff's conduit in the N. W. :1;.4, of the 
N. W. :1;.4, of Section 25, Township 2 South, Range 1 Ea.st, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, is 66 feet in width; and 
it is ordered 'that this case may be reopened for the intro-
duction of evidence as to the width of said right of way 
in said Seetion 25. This decree is binding upon the 
parties hereto in said Sections 24 and 25, but the court 
reserves jurisdiction to hear evidence on and determine 
the width of the said right of way in said Section 25 
and to subsequently alter the provisions of this decree 
pursuant to the findings that may be made on the width 
of said right of way and the other provisions to be 
affected thereby. 
7. It is further ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND 
DECREED that the decree may be subsequently modi-
fied by the consideration of other proposed methods of 
protecting plaintiff's conduit and right of way and that 
the court hereby retains jurisdiction to he exercised by 
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petition of either party upon notice to be fixed by the 
court, to modify, enlarge or otherwise change the terms 
hereof for the protection of plaintiff's said conduit and 
right of way. 
8. It is further ORDERED that costs are to be 
borne by the party incurring the same. 
Dated this 1st day of September, 1949. 
A half-tone reproduction has been made of the 
Exhibit A to which the findings and judgment refer, and 
is included in this brief. 
On September 6, 1949, defendant served and filed 
its motion for a new trial, which was denied by the court 
on September 23, 1949. 
Upon application of defendant and pursuant to para-
graph 6 of the judgment, the court granted defendant'>s 
motion to reopen case for the purpose of taking further 
evidence. The defenda;nt thereupon served and filed its 
supplemental answer under paragraph 6 of the judgment 
wherein it prayed that the ,court adjudicate that plain-
tiff's easement and right of way as the same crosses 
Section 25, is of a width of 41!2 feet (R. 105-108). Upon 
traverse by plaintiff the said matter :3ame on for hearing, 
and on December 10, 1949, the court made, entered and 
filed i'ts order and supplemental judgment (R. 119, 120), 
adjudicating as follows: 
"* * * it is hereby ordered that the defendant 
take nothing by supplemental answer and that the 
plaintiff owns and holds a right of way across 
Section 25, Twp. 2 South, Hange 1 East, Salt 
Lake Base and .Meridian, for aforesaid Big Cot-
tonwood conduit of a minimum width of 33 feet 
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on each side of the center line of ea:ch conduit, 
as constructed, for the proper maintenance, re-
pair, and repla:cement of said conduit; that the 
decree of this court as made and entered on 
September 1, 1949, shall be and remain in all 
respects as made and entered provided that this 
order s1mll not preclude further hearings as to 
the width of the right of way and easement of 
plaintiff across said Section 25, pursuant to the 
terms of paragraph 6 o1f the decree herein on 
September 1, 1949. '' 
The aforesaid supplemental order and judgment was 
supported by findings of fact (R. 121-123) reading as 
follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That plaintiff is now, and since September 9, 
1905 has been, the owner of a right-of-way and ease-
ment by virtue of a grant to it by the Utah Light and 
Railway Company, a Utah corporation, granting plain-
tiff the right to construct, maintain and operate reser-
voirs, dams, ditches, conduits pole lines and the appli-
ances and utilities connected therewith across and over 
Section 25, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian, which grant was recorded December 
26, 1905 in Book 7 -G of Deeds, pages 23-G in the office 
of the County Recorder of Salt Lake County, Utah. 
2. That in the years 1906 and 1907 plaintiff con-
structed a concrete conduit 3% feet high by 4% feet 
wide across said Section 25, pursuant to the grant so 
made to it, for the purpose of conveying water from the 
mouth of Big Cottonwood Canyon to plaintiff city for 
use by its inhabitants. That said conduit, herein refer-
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red to as Big Cottonwood Conduit, has remained in the 
original place where constructed since the time of its 
construction. 
3. That defendant was, on the date of the com-
mencement of this action, and still is, the owner of the 
fee of said Section 25, whereon plaintiff has constructed 
its said Big Cottonwood Conduit. 
4. That the said grant of easement and right-of-way 
does not, by its terms, state the width of any particular 
right-of-way granted therein. The court finds that it is 
not necessary to dispose of the issues here involved to 
determine the exact width of the right-of-way granted by 
said Utah Light and Railway Company to plaintiff for 
the plaintiff's said Big Cottonwood Conduit. But the 
court finds, from the evidence now before it, that plaintiff 
requires a minimum right-of-way and easement of 33 
feet on each side of the center line of said conduit, as 
constructed, for the proper maintenance, repair, and re-
placement of said conduit. 
From the foregoing Findings of I1'act the court 
makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That plaintiff owns and holds a right-of-way and 
easement for the proper maintenance, repair, and re-
placement of its said Big Cottonwood Conduit having 
a minimum width of 33 feet on each side· of the center 
line of said conduit as constructed across said Section 
25, Township 2 South, Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian. 
2. That defendant is not entitled to have the Find-
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ings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and decree heretofore 
entered herein on September 1, 1949, altered in any 
respects as to the width of plaintiff's said right-of-way 
across said Section 25 and said decree is binding, without 
a:tterations, upon the parties hereto. 
3. That plaintiff is entitled to an order to the effect 
that d~fendant take nothing by its supplemental answer 
and -that the decree of this court, as made and entered 
on September 1, 1949, remain unaltered in all respects. 
Dated this lOth day of December, 1949. 
On September 28, 1949, the defendant relying upon 
the provisions of Paragraph 7 of the judgment dated 
September 1, 1949, served and filed its motion for an order 
for authority to serve and file its application for a sup-
plemental judgment requiring the plaintiff to mark and 
stake upon the ground the west boundary line of its right 
of way easement as the same extends across Sections 24 
and 25 aforesaid, when the width of the right of way 
easement across said Section 25 was determined by the 
court, and also to require the plaintiff to make certain 
cross section surveys over defendant's land below plain-
tiff's conduit and to file in said court and .cause the field 
notes thereof and other proper maps and records of such 
surveys (R-95, 96). A copy of defendant's a;pplication 
for supplemental judgment was served and filed with 
said notice of motion ( R-97 -102). On Octolber 10, 1949, 
the court denied defendant's motion. 
On December 13, 1949, the defendant and intervenor 
served and filed their notice of appeal to the S'upreme 
Court, and the defendant deposited with the clerk of the 
District Court a cash deposit of $300 in lieu of cost bond. 
Thereafter within the time authorized by due and timely 
extensions, the record of trial was filed in the Supreme 
Court on Aprilll, 1950. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER AND JUDG-
MENT DATED DECEMBER 10, 1949, IS ERRON-
EOUS IN ITS ADJUDICATION THAT PLAINTIFF 
OWNS AND HOLDS A RIGHT OF WAY ACROSS 
SECTION 25, TWP. 2 SOUTH, RANGE 1 EAST, 
SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, OF A MINI-
MUM WIDTH OF 33 FEET ON EACH SIDE OF THE 
CENTER LINE OF SAID CONDUIT, AS CON-
STRUCTED, FOR THE PROPER MAINTENANCE, 
REPAIR AND REPLACEMENT OF SAID CONDUIT. 
Plaintiff acquired its right of way easement across 
and upon the aforesaid Sections 24 and 25 by virtue of 
grant deeds from the fee simple owners of the land over 
which the easement was granted. 'l_1he deed from Haynes 
(Plaintiff's exhibit X) specifically granted to Salt Lake 
City 
"A perpetual right of way for water conduit, 
said right of way consisting of a strip of land 66 
feet wide and 1322 feet long. The center longi-
tudinal line of said right of way. (Here follows a 
description of the center longitudinal line.) 
'l'he width of the right of way over Section 24 under 
the Haynes grant is not in dispute in this action as the 
deed definitely states the width and length of said right 
of way easement. As to Section 25 however a different 
situation ·prevails. 'l'he grant deed from the Utah Light 
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and Railway Company to Salt Lake City (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit Y) differs radically in its legal effect from the 
Haynes deed. Excluding immaterial parts of the Rail-
way Company's deed there is dis.covered the following 
relevant provision : 
''Also a right of way and easement for all 
reservoirs, dams, dit·ches, conduits, pole lines and 
appliances and utilities connected therewith to be 
constructed by the City, wherever these may be 
located now or hereafter within lands owned by 
the Utah Light and Railway Company particularly 
within Sections 23, 26 and 25, Twp. 2 South, Range 
1 East, Salt Lake Meridian • • •.'' 
It will be noted from the a:.bove that the location of 
the conduit easement is not definitely specified, and 
neither is its width. The grant is in the nature of a 
"floating" or "roving" easement. The rule governing 
the construction of the grant of such type of easement 
is stated as follows: 
"The extent of an easement is determinable 
by a true ~onstruction of the grant or reservation 
by which it is created, aided by any concomitant 
circumstances which have a legitimate tendency 
to show the intention of the parties. It is im-
proper, however, to refer to the parol negotiations 
which preceded or accompanied the execution of 
the instrument. Doubtful language in a convey-
ance granting an easement is construed in favor of 
the grantee. If a grant is specific in its terms, it 
is decisive of the limits of the easement. If an 
easement is not specifically defined, the r'ule is 
that the ea.sement need onlv be s·uch as is reason~ 
ably neccssar·y arnd conven~ent for the purpose for 




a grant of an easement is general as to the extent 
of the burden to be imposed upon the servient 
tenement, an exercise of the .right with the ac-
quiescence and consent of both parties, in a par-
ticular course or manner, fixes the right and limits 
it to the particular course or manner in which it 
has been enjoyed." (Emphasis supplied.) (17 
Am. Jur.-Easements, Sec. 97, p. 995.) 
"A general reservation, or a grant, of a right 
of way, is limited to a use such as is reasonably 
necessary and convenient, and as little burden-
some to the servient estate as possible for the use 
contemplated." (Annotation, 15 LRA (NS) 293 
with Citation of Authorities.) 
"In case the location and limits of the right of 
way are not sufficiently defined in the grant, a 
reasonably convenient and suitable way is in-
tended, and the right can not be exercised over 
the entire tract." (1 Thompson on Real Property, 
Perm. Ed., Sec. 358, p. 578.) 
"The grant of a right of way without stating 
its width will be held to be a suitable and con-
venient way, which will be determined by its suffi-
ciency to afford ingress and egress to the ownen 
and occupants of tho dominant estate, what is suit-
able and convenient heing dependent upon the 
circumstances of the case. The servient tenement 
cannot be bunleued with tho occupancy of a 
greater width than is reasonably necessary for 
the uses for which the right of way is reserved as 
an easement, where no width is defined in the 
reservation. If the grant states merely the object 
for which the way is granted the dimensions must 
be inferred to be such as are reasonably sufficient 
for tho accomplishment of that object * * *." 
19 Corpus .Juris Sec. 204, p. 968.) 
''Having made its selection under its deed, 
respondent was bound thereby, and had no right 
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to go elsewhere and do any act upon appellant's 
land not authorized by him. ·when it went upon 
the land described in the deed, and cleared and 
prepared its right of way, its grant became fixed 
and certain, and it thereafter had no interest or 
right whatever in any other part of the premises. 
* * * Of course, the respondent must confine its 
occupancy to the identical location selected. It is 
entitled to the use of that, and nothing more. 
* * *" (McCue v. Bellingham Bay VI ater Co., 5 
Wash. 156; 31 Pac. 461, 462.) 
"The instrument recites that the grantors 
'grant, bargain, sell, convey, and confirm unto 
the said party of the second part and to his heirs 
and assigns, a right of way * * * for a water pire 
line over, upon and across the following described 
lands. * * *' * * * It is next urged that the deed 
is void for uncertainty as to the location of the 
right of way. It is true, the exact boundaries are 
not described in the deed, except as to the tracts 
of land over which the pipe line shall run. * * * 
In the ,case at bar the pleadings admit and the 
evidence shows that such a selection anrl oc-cupa-
tion of a right of way strip took place in 1891. Not 
only was the route marked out and selected, 'hut 
a ditch was dug upon the strip, with the intention 
of using the right of way for the purposes of the 
grant. Under the J\fcCne Case, the grant here 
therefore became fixed and certain as to location." 
(Everett ·water Co. v. Powers, 79 Pac. ("Wash.) 
617-620.) 
"It will be noticed that the easement granted 
by the deeds to plaintiffs and their predecessors 
is couched in general terms and is somewhat 
ambiguous. ·where an easement in land is granted 
in general terms, ·without giving definite location 
and description 1o it, so that the pa.rt of land over 
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which the right is to be e~:ercised cannot be defi-
nitely ascertained, the grantee does not thereby 
acquire a right to use the servient estate without 
limitation as to the place or n'ode in which the 
easement is to be enjoyed. But the location may be 
subsequently fixed :by an express agreement of 
the parties, or by an implied agreement arising 
out of the use of a particular way by the grantee 
anrl acquiescence on the part of the grantor, pro-
virled the way is located within the boundaries of 
the land over which the right is granted. In other 
words, it is a familiar rule that when a right of 
way is granted without defined limits, the practi-
cal location and use of such way by the grantee 
under his deed, acquieced in for a long time by the 
grantor, will operate to fix the location, where the 
intention is not fairly expressed in the terms of 
the grant controlling the future location." (Cul-
lison v. Hotel Seaside, 2G8 Pac. (Oregon) 758-759.) 
The determination of the width of the right of way 
over Section 25 is of tremendous importance to the de-
fendant and intervenor, because of the fact that the 
defendant and intervenor are enjoined and restrained 
from removing either sand, gravel, rocks, or other mate-
rial from the slopes below plaintiff's right of way and 
conduit, which removal will disturb the slope below said 
plaintiff's right of way and conduit, by increasing the 
pitch of the slope to a steeper, uniform slo:pe than a 
slope measuring 2 feet horizontal to 1 foot vertical below 
said right of way "beginning at the outer edge of said 
right of way and sloping downward to the ·wasatch 
Boulevard, which outer edge of said right of way on the 
ground is pe.pendicularly below a point of 33 feet on a 
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horizontal plane out from and at right angles to the 
center line of plaintiff's conduit." (Judgment Para-
graph 3). The provisions of the judgment offering de-
fendant and intervenor an alternative plan for com-
pliance with the requirements of Paragmph 3 of the 
judgment, are best explained 'by reference to Exhibit A. 
of the Judgment and Findings. It will he noticed that 
point B on said Exhibit is theoretically placed 
33 feet out from the center line of the conduit. 
Stated otherwise, the court prescribed the measure of 
compliance by defendant and intervenor with its man-
dates by selecting the western boundary line of the 
right of way as one of the crucial points in determining 
both the denuded ''slope adequate for right of way'' 
(Line G to B) ; the two to one denuded '' slo<pe of 
safety" (Lines F', E, B) and also the one and one-half 
to one slope of safety with mantle (Lines D, C, B). The 
legality ·of these directions must rest upon a determina-
tion that the plaintiff's right of way over Section 25 
extends 33 feet westerly or in the direction of Wasatch 
Boulevard from. the center line of the conduit. It is sub-
mitted that without such adjudication the beginning 
points of the slopes of safety are uncertain. 
Assuming that plaintiff is entitled to support, not 
only for its conduit, but also for its right of way, it 
becomes a matter of importance to fix and determine 
the location and dimensions of plaintiff's "roving" 
right of way easement conveyed by the Railway Com-
pany's deed. -Without this determination being positive 
and fixed there is no foundation upon which to base the 
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slo1pes of safety for the easement. Obviously'" the com-
mencement of a slope of safety for an easement along a 
hillside of the nature involved in this action for an 
easement 10 feet wide will not be the same as for an 
easement 50 feet wide. Exhibit A clearly demonstrates 
that if the plaintiff's easement is only 30 feet in width 
(i.e. 15 feet on each side of the center line of the conduit) 
instead of a width of 66 feet, assumed by the Court, that 
th(~ location of point B will be entirely different from 
what it would be if it were only 15 feet from the center 
line of the conduit. It is because of this situation that 
the defendant and intervenor insisted that the court 
construe and interpret the grant from the Railway Com-
pany. ·without this determination the data indicated on 
Exhibit A do not possess any legality. The slopes of 
safety may conm1ence at a point many feet beyond where 
the right of way extends. Such adjudication would be 
clearly imposing upon the owner of the servient estate 
a burden not within the purview of the easm:1ent grant. 
It would awount to the taking of a land owners property 
without compensation. rrhis aspect of the case introduces 
the question of "secondary easements." The District 
Court of Appeal of California in Smith, et al., v. Rock 
Creek Water Corp., et al., 208 Pac. (2d) 705-707, defined 
a secondary easement thus: 
"The secondary easement is no more than the 
right to make repairs and to do such things as are 
necessary to the exercise of the right and to do 
them only when necessary and in such reasonaible 
manner as not to increase the burden needlessly 
on the servient estate or to enlarge it bv alter-
ation in the mode of operation. * * * Thd use of 
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the easement may not be changed in such manner 
as to make it either more or less burdensome to 
the servient estate." 
This definition of "secondary easement'' finds support 
in prior decisions of the Supreme Court of California in 
North Fork Wa,ter Compan·y v. Edwards, et al, 54 Pac. 
69, and in Joseph v. Ager, 41 Pac. 422. In the Joseph 
case the court in discussing an easement to take water 
from the land of another said : 
"Such an easement does not give its owner 
the right to commit a trespass upon the servient 
tenement, or to exer.cise the easement after any 
manner which happ~ms to suit his pleasure. His 
right is measured by the terms of his grant; or, 
where the supposed original grant does not ap-
pear, hy the prescriptive use. '11his, however, in-
cludes what are called 'secondary easements,' such 
as the right to enter upon the servient tenement 
and make repairs, and to do such things as are 
necessary for the full exercise of the right. But 
these secondary easements must 'be exercised only 
when necessary, and in such a reasonable manner 
as not to needlessly increase the burden upon the 
servient tenement.'' 
The court further quoted from Gale .O?'t Easemen.ts, p. 
237: 
''As every easement is a restriction upon the 
right of property of the owner of the servient 
tenement, no alteration can be made in the mode 
of enjoyment by the owner of the dominant heri-
tage, the effect of which will be to increase such 
restriction.'' 
The authorities thus indicate that "secondary 
easements" are of very limited operation. They certainly 
cannot include the right to commence the slopes of safety 
of a right of way at a point exterior to the boundary 
line of the easement grant. If the owner of a right of 
way can impose upon the servient tenement the duty to 
support the right of way the calculation of the slope of 
safety must begin at the 'boundary of the right of way, 
and not at a point beyond that 'boundary. 
Defendant and intervenor assert that by the refusal 
of the court to determine the width of the plaintiff's right 
of way easement, and to cause it to be marked on the 
ground, invalidated the ruhove designated mandates con-
tained in the judgment. The adjudication of the width 
of the right of way over Section 25 was one of the duties 
imposed upon the court by this litigation, and without 
such adjudication a grievous error was committed. 
1. The supplemental order and judgment is not 
supported by the supplemental findings of fact dated 
December 10, 1949, by which the court spec:fically 
refused to determine the exact width of the right of 
way granted by Utah Light and Railroad Company 
to plaintiff. 
The court 'by its supplemental findings of fact (R-
117, 118) formally refusel to adjudicate the width of 
plaintiff's right of way over Section 25. Its refusal is 
therefore beyond question. The contention of defendant 
and intervenor that it was the duty of the court to con-
strue the grant of the Railway Company for the purpose 
of determining the width of the right of way, has been 
set forth above. 'The issue was squarely presented to 
the court by defendant's application pursuant to Para-
graph 6 of the judgment. Defendant filed its supple-
mental answer wherein it prayed that the court adjudi-
cate that the width of plaintiff's easement and right of 
way as same .crossed over Section 25, is 4Yz feet. (R-105-
108). 
In spite of the fact that the court declined to deter-
mine the width of this right of way, the supplemental 
order and judgment (R-119-120) specifically declares: 
"That the plaintiff owns and holds a right of 
way across Section 25, etc., for its Big Cottonwood 
conduit of a minimum width of 33 feet on each 
side of the center line of its conduit as constructed 
for the proper maintenance, repair, and replace-
ment of said conduit." (Emphasis supplied.) 
There is no findings of fact to support the quoted 
portion of the supplemental order and judgment, and 
therefore such part of the judgment is clearly erroneous 
and should be set aside. 
2. The Court's Supplemental Findings of Fact, 
dated December 10, 1949, declaring that plaint:ff 
requ:res a_ minimum right of way and easement of 33 
feet on each side of the center line of its conduit as 
constructed for the proper maintenance, repair, and 
replaceinent of said conduit does not support the 
adjudication in said supplement'al order and judg-
ment thatplaintiff is the owner and holder of such 
right of way across said Section 25. 
The supplemental judgment declares the plaintiff 
is the oumer and, holder of a right of way of 33 feet on 
each side of the center line of its conduit. The supple-
mental finding declares that plaintiff requires a mini-
mum right of way easement of 33 feet on each side of the 
center line of its conduit as constructed for the proper 
maintenance, etc. The fact that the plaintiff requires 
such a right of way is not the equivalent of ownership 
of such an casement. Instances may be easily imagined 
where the effective use of a right of way easement re-
qttires it should be wider than the easement actually 
owned. ·when the court found that the plaintiff rquires 
an easement of a certain width, he did not find that it 
owns and holds an easement of a certain width. If Salt 
Lake City had acquired an easement only 20 feet in width 
by the Railway Company's grant, it might easily be dis-
covered that it requires an easement 40 feet in width, but 
such n'ecessity would not increase the width of the ease-
ment from 20 feet to 40 feet against the owner of the 
servient tenement. The necessities of Salt Lake City can 
be met only by acquiring a wider easement. This find-
ing of "requirement" is not the same as the finding of 
"ownership." It is manifest that the court by its refusal 
to adjudicate the width of the plaintiff's right of way 
did not intend that its finding of "requirement" would 
be an equivalent of the finding of "ownership." This 
conclusion is further emphasized by the proviso of the 
supplemental order and judgment which declares '''that 
this order shall not preclude further hearings as to the 
\vidth of the right of way and easement of the plaintiff 
across said Section 25 pursuant to the terms of Para-
gra!ph 6 of the decree entered herein on September 1, 
1949." 'The situation thus presented makes it clear that 
on this hasis the adjudication in the supplemental judg-
ment of ownership of a right of wa.y 66 feet wide cannot 
be upheld. 
II. 
THE PART OF FINDING OF FACT 2 WHICH 
FINDS THAT PLAINTIFF'S CONDUIT IS CON-
STRUCTED AND INSTALLED ALONG THE CEN-
TER OF RIGHT OF WAY 66 FEET WIDE IS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. THE LOCA-
TION OF SAID CONDUIT ON SAID RIGHT OF 
WAY WAS NOT PROVED AND IS UNKNOWN. 
Finding 2 of the findings of fact dated September 
1, 1949, specifically declares that the conduit "is con-
structed and installed along the center of a right of way 
66 feet wide, which right of way is necessary and is pos-
sessed and owned and held by plaintiff across * • * said 
S:ection 24 and said Section 25 • • •.'' The court re-
fused to find on the issue as to the width of the right of 
way across Section 25. (See Point I, supra). In view of 
this declination by the court in the proceedings which 
resulted in the supplemental order and judgment, the 
statement in finding 2 that the conduit "is constructed 
and installed along the center of a right of way 6G feet 
wide" is completely nullified. The city owns a right of 
way but its width is not determined. This question may 
be posed: "How could the court find that the conduit 
is constructed and installed along the center of a rig-ht 
of way 66 feet wide, when there is no determination that 
the right of way is 66 feet wide, or of any other width f'' 
With this condition of the record the conclusion is mani-
fest that the finding that the conduit is constructed and 
installed abong the center of a 66 foot right of way, is 
supported hy no evidence. The fa,ct is that the position of 
said conduit on the right of way in Section 2·5 is unknown. 
As an example of the type of evidence submitted by 
the plaintiff as to the position of the conduit on the right 
of way, the following testimony of Charles V. Gardner, 
a civil engineer in the employment of the plaintiff's 
engineering department, is reproduced: 
"Q. I am asking you if you are familiar with the 
City Engineering reoords ~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Have you ever observed any survey made of 
that conduit after it was constructed and 
placed in position~ 
A. We have the records of this here, the center 
line description. 
Q. Yes; but was that center line description so 
made from field notes, before or after the 
,conduit was constructed; that is what I want 
to know. I want to lmow where that conduit 
is? 
A. That is one thing I can't say because I never 
made the notes. I was not there at the time 
of the construction. I don't know whether 
they made the notes at the time they were 
constructing it, or just before, but these notes 
are tied, as stated, to a certain section point. 
Q. Is that 24 or 251 
A. 23, 24, 25 and 26, Township 2 South, Range 
1 East. 
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Q. Where is the right-of-way description tied 
in the disputed area; that is what I am inter-
ested in 1 
A. It is tied to that certain point. 
Q. To what-24 1 
A. 23, 24, 25, 26, the corner common to those 
sections. 
Q. '11he common corner~ 
A. Yes. ? 
Q. Do you know, actually, where that common 
corner is actually located? 
A. I have never actually located it myself, no. 
Q. You say these field notes are based upon a 
tie to that common corner 1 
A. That is right. 
Q. And it is because it is based on that tie to 
the common corner that you draw the de-
duction that the conduit is in the center of the 
right-of-way; is that correct? 
A. That is right. 
Q. Is there any evidence in those field notes that 
the conduit got off the right-of-way? 
A. None. 
Q. At this point I am confining my questions to 
this 1 
A. None. 
Q. You are unable to state whether or not those 
field notes were made before or after the con-
duit was placed in position 1 
A. No. 
Q. 'l_lhere is nothing in the record to indicate it? 
A. I don't know of any. 
Q. Let me ask you about those field notes. Are 
those notes indicative of a survey of the con-
duit in place, or was it a ~mrvcy of the center 
line of the right-of-wayf 
A. Those field notes are the center line of the 
conduit. 
· _ A. Do they say that, or .are they talking about 
another center, which is the center line in the 
Haynes easement ground that we have here. 
You have heard of that, have you not~ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Do those field notes refer to that description 
in there~ 
A. . Those field notes tie to the center line of the 
conduit at certain points. They do not refer 
to the right-of-way." (R-202-204). 
Reference is also made to the testimony of W. H. 
Staker, who worked on the construction of the conduit 
trench in 1905 and1906. 
"Q. As you proceeded with the trench what kin::l 
of information were you given by the engi-
neerf 
A. There were engineers on the jo;b all the time, 
and, to begin with they gave us stakes, and 
showed us the center line, and then stakes that 
showed us the depth of cut, and the depth that 
needed filling. As we proceeded with the 
work, and got as close as we could in our 
judgment they would give us new stakes. 
• • •• 
Q. These stakes that they gave you in the bottom 
of the trench, where were 'they placed with 
respect to the center of the trench~ 
A. They gav{) us what we call the hub, a square 
. stake, _about two inches square; then when we 
got down ~close to. the elevation, they put a 
tag (tack) where the center was, and we 
would measure from the center to each side, 
each particular part of the conduit . 
. -Q.. So that pBg gave you the exact center of the 
conduit? 
A. The center line of the conduit. 
Q. Then you measured out an equal distance to 
hoth sides to get your side walls f 
A. 'That is right." (R-451-452). 
,. . ,. 
"Q. (By Mr. Riter) I would like to ask this ques-
tion in this connection: You spoke about 
those stakes in the bottom of the trench. That 
was the center line of the trench, not the 
center line of the City right-of-way' 
A. I don't know any more. That was the center 
line of the trench, as far as we were con-
cerned. I don't know anything about the 
other. 
Q. You don't know anything about the relation-
shi!P of the trench itself to the right-of-way 
acquired by the City7 
A. No, I would not. 
Q. You say you measured an even distance from 
the center line stakes that had a tack in them 1 
A. Yes. 
• • • 
Q. S:o the measurements were made from the 
center of the trench to the outer walls of the 
conduitf 
A. That is right. 
Q. And it was in that area that the forms were 
built~ 
A. That is right. 
Q. You don't mean to imply that was the center 
line of the right-of-way~ 
A. I don't know anything about the right-of-way. 
I assume they had followed their line in the 
first place, the stakes on top when they first 
gave them to us, and we followed them 
straight clown." ( R-457 -458). 
In this connection Plaintiff's Exhibit J (R-151-180) 
which is a print taken from the tracing in the vaults of 
the city engineer is important (R. 152). A delineation 
of the right of way and the location of the conduit there-
on is explained by Mr. Gardner in the following col-
loquy: 
"Q. If I make the statement that is why (sic) that 
conduit was actually built on the western 
edge, the borders of the west~rn boundary 
line of the right-of-way, what is your ~nsw~r 
to that statement~ · · · · 
A. l\fy answer is that the conduit is built: the 
center line of the conduit is on the center line 
of the right-of-way. 
Q. Is the right-of-way staked? 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
Q. Then how do you know? Do you know where 
the exterior lines of that right-of-way are? 
A. From the city engineer's records, we have 
proof that follows the center line of the con-
duit, showing that the right of way ex:tends 
thirty-three feet on either side of this center 
line of this conduit. 
Q. Is that based on field notes, or what? 
A. Based on field notes, yes sir. · 
Q. "\Vere those field notes taken after the con-
duit was placed in position~ 
A. I don't know." (R-201-202).· . 
Attention is invited to the fact that: the right of way 
grant under the Hayne's deed (Plaintiff's. Exhibit X) 
is definitely fixed with a width of 66 feet. The last quoted 
testimony of the witness Gardner shows that he assumed 
that the width of the right of way over Section 25 under· 
the Railway Company's grant.was also 66 feet. As has 
been demonstrated, the Railway Company 1s grant is that 
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of a "roving" easement. Its width has never been deter-
mined and the court refused in this case to determine its 
width. It was a plain assumption on the part of the 
draftsman in the preparation of exhibit J that the right 
of way over 'Section 25 was of the same width as over 
Section 24. While the field notes may be accurate 
in locating the center line of the conduit, they cannot 
possibly show the width of the right of way over Section 
25, because the grant makes it indefinite. It is proper 
therefore to inquire how the placement of the center line 
of the ~onduit can determine that the conduit is con-
structed on the center line of a right of way of uncertain 
width 1 'l'he conclusion seems to be inescapable that the 
finding that the conduit is constructed and installed along 
the center of a right of way 66 feet wide is supported by 
no evidence but is based upon the false assumption of 
the city engineer that because the right of way was 66 
feet in width under the Hayne's grant (Plaintiff's Ex-
hibit X) it is also 66 feet wide under the Railway Com-
pany's grant (Plaintiff's Exhi'bit Y). 
Addressing ourselves again to Exhibit A, which is a 
part of the findings of fact and judgment in this action, 
it will ·be seen that as to Section 25 the court placed the 
conduit in the theoretical center of the 66 foot right of 
way and made its computations and determinations ac-
cordingly. Defendant contends that the placement of the 
conduit on Exhibit A in the center of a GG foot right of 
way is based upon the same error which caused the city 
engineer on Exhibit J to ass1.tme that the right of way 
over Section 25 was 66 feet in width. Such assumption 
52 
when transferred to Exhibit A, produces erroneous re-
sults in the judgment which are highly prejudicial to the 
defendant in the adjudication of the slopes of safety. 
The condition demonstrates one ef the serious errors 
committed in this case, which inflicts most serious dam-
age to defendant in its operations by depriving it of the 
right to remove earth material from its land which other-
wise it would be entitled to do. 
III. 
THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPHS 1 AND 
2 OF THE JUDGMENT DATED SEPTEMBER 1, 
1949, VvHICH PROHIBITS DEFENDANT AND IN-
TERVENOR FROM REMOVING SAND, ROCKS, 
GRAVEL, ETC., FROM PLAINTIFF'S RIGHT OF 
\V AY, AND REQUIRES DEFENDANT TO RE-
STORE THE PLACES ON SAID RIGHT OF WAY 
FROM WHICH SOIL, ROCKS, GRAVEL, ETC., 
HAVE BEEN REMOVED BY FILLING DECLIVI-
TIES WITH SOIL, ETC., AND REPLANTING WITH 
VEGETATION ARE ERRONEOUS. 
Paragraph 1 of the judgment dated September 1, 
1949, orders defendant immediately to "cease and de-
sist from removing soil or rocks from the surface of 
plaintiff's right of way as it crosses defendant's land, 
being a right of way 33 feet wide on the lower side closer 
to ~Wasatch Boulevard from the center line of plaintiff's 
Big Cottonwood conduit as constructed upon the land, 
said 33 feet to be measured in a horizontal plane at right 
angles to the center line of said conduit." By Paragraph 
2 the defendant is directed to ''restore the surface of 
plaintiff's right of way at the 1place where such surface 
has been disturbed ·by said defendants '*' * * by filling 
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in earth material and top soil to an average depth of 12 
inches, and that said defendant on or before the 31st day 
of December, 1949, at such times as weather and plant-
ing conditions are favorable, plant shrubs '"' '"' '"'.'' 
According to the plaintiff's evidence soil material 
was removed from an area of about 94 feet laterally 
along the conduit commencing about 8 feet from the con-
duit and extending down the slope of a distance of about 
60 feet (R ... 312l, 491, 492). 
J. B. Walker, the president of defendant company, 
testified a.s follows: 
''A. There are exhibits here that show that area 
very fully, and the only thing that happened 
at that area, it represents where the bull-
dozer would be hacked up, and a bulldozer 
is about twenty feet long, with a blade on it; 
and what disturbance is shown there is merely 
what would occur with the cleats of the bull-
dozer digging down into ·the ground. 
Q. How much of a declivity did the bulldozer 
make at that point? 
A. It would be very, very small, and inconse-
quential. 
Q. In how wide an area? 
A. There is an area there where they backed up 
for about-that is, 1paralleling the conduit, 
there is an area there of about ninety feet in 
length, paralleling the conduit. 
Q. Did you take any earth, remove any earth 
therefrom1 
A. No, not in that area. It was merely what 
would be churned up with the bulldozer 
cleats. 
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Q. ·was the bulldozer placed so it could remove 
earth at that poinH 
A. No. The blade was down-hill. The removal 
of earth, as shown by our cross section, 
started approximately sixty feet from that 
point. 
Q. So, when the bulldozer entered that area, did 
you see it working there~ 
A. Y.es, I was there all the time. 
Q. Did you know the extent of the right-of-way 
at that time 1 
A. No. 
Q. Did you remove any earth from the right-of-
way within that thirty-three foot limit? 
A. No, I would say not. The area, as I said, 
shows the marks of the bulldozer treads go-
ing up there, and any earth that would be 
removed would be what would be kicked 
loose as a result of backing the machine up 
there. 
Q. In other words, you did not put the bulldozer 
up there for the purpose of removing the 
earth 1 
A. No, because you could not hold a bulldozer 
on a plane parallel with the conduit, on that 
slope. The slope was too stee,p, and it would 
be very dangerous to attempt to use a bull-
dozer to scrape in the mannerwhich you im-
ply. It could not be done. 
Q. ·what is your testimony with respect to the 
removal of earth from the .city's easement? 
A. Except as I have noted, there has been none 
removed there. There is, of course, this ques-
tion as to where their right-of-way begins and 
ends, >because of tl.J.e-
'"' ~ .. 
Q. (By Mr. Riter) In other words, to state it 
properly, the easement, the right-of-way ease-
ment is not marked on the ground 1 
A. No, it is uot. 
Q. Where does your .excavating and removal of 
the soil commen.ce with respect to the center 
line of the conduitf 
A. I would say that that first evidence of any 
degree of removal is forty feet down the 
slope. That is a:bout where the blade would 
start picking up. 
Q. (By the Court) That is forty feet from the 
center line of the conduit 1 
A. That would be my estimate. I have never 
measured it. 
Q. That is where your series of operations com-
mencedf 
A. No, our operations commenced approximately 
sixty or sixty-five feet from there. 
Q. From the center line of the conduit? 
A. Yes. Our cross sections also show it on Ex-
hibits 24, 25 and 26. 
Q. How much soil do you think has been re-
moved between the forty foot limit and the 
sixty or sixty-five foot limit 1 
A. I would like to have the question again. 
(Question read.) 
Q. How much soil has been removed between a 
point forty feet from the center line of the 
conduit and sixty feet from the center line of 
the conduiH 
A. But very little, ~possibly-oh, over the whole 
area possibly an average of five or six inches 
to a foot. That is, you mean forty feet out 1 
Q. Yes. 
A. And from there to the sixty foot point where 
we started production. 
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Q. Yes. 
A. That ''muld be a'bout right. 
Q. How much earth has been removed, if any, 
within the area extending forty feet from the 
center line of the conduit~ 
THE COURT: Extending forty feet to 
where1 
l\IR. RITER: Extending from the center 
line of the conduit to a line forty feet therefron.1. 
A. ']'hat would be pretty hard to state. I will 
attempt to compute it for you. 
THE COUHT: I think maybe I don't under-
stand it. Do you mean right next to the conduit1 
MR IU'f EH : Yes. 
THE \vTfN ESS: Over what area'? 
Q. (By 1\Ir. Riter) Over the extent of your ac-
tive opening workings at that point in the 
gravel pit. 
'fHE COURT: Mr. \Valker, you testified 
you have not removed any soil closer than forty 
feet1 
A. I said that the only thing that was done in 
that area, Judge, was what would be torn up 
or churned up by backing the caterpillar up 
on it. 
}.Ill. RITER: That is what I wanted. 
Q. (Continued) 'l'he only amount that would 
be removrd 1vould be under the backing of 
the cat. up successively, which was not too ex-
tensive, because there were not many passes 
made in a given spot. 
In other words, take an area twelve feet 
wide, the cat. poHsibly would back up over 
a ~place--the blade on a cat. is only that wide. 
'rhe amount of dirt that would be re-
moved would be the amount that would be 
churned 11p by the cat. backing up. Some of 
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that might be loose and fall down a little 
farther, 'but that is all that would be involved 
there; and the amount would be very, very 
hard to state." (R-777-780). 
The Court's mandate in connection with the alleged 
soil removal from plaintiff's right of way shows the 
error in the refusal of the court to adjudicate the width 
of the right of way over Section 25. (This disturbance 
of the surface soil occurred entirely in Section 25, and 
not in Section 24). The provisions of the juclg1nent 
above quoted assume that the conduit is in the center 
of the right of way and that the width of the right of 
way is 66 feet. It is believed that it has been demon-
strated herein that until the court determine;, the width 
of the right of way over Section 25 it is not in a posi-
tion to reach any conclusion as to whether defendant 
had removed any soil material from the right of way. 
On this hasis alone the wbove quoted parts of the judg-
ment have no legal foundation. The fact that the de-
fendant may have removed a small amount of soil at a 
point commencing 8 feet from the conduit is not proof 
that it removed soil from plaintiff's right of way be-
cause there is no proof as to the limits and boundary 
of said right of way on the westerly side thereof. 
1. Defendant owned the soil, rocks, gravel, etc., 
on said right of way, and had the right to remove 
same if by such removal it did not impair the safety 
of plaintiff's conduit. 
If it be assumed that plaintiff's right of way ex-
tended in a we:!terly direction of 33 feet from the center 
line of the conduit, the quoted parts of the judgment fail 
to recognize defendant's legal rights in connection with 
this right of way easement. Plaintiff's right of way 
grant constitutes an easement only and is not a grant in 
fee. (Hayward v. Mason, 104 Pac. (Wash.) 139; Peop!e 
ex rel Bryan' v. S:eele, 124 NYS 711, 713). Fur~her, t:he 
said right of way was not an exclusive easement. (2 
Thompson Real Prop. (Perm. Ed.) Sec .. 578; Pasadena 
v. California Michigan Land and Water Co., 17 Cal. (2d) 
616, 110 Pac. (2d) 983.) An exclusive easement is an un-
usual interest in land; it has been said to amount almost 
to a conveyance of the fee. No intention to convey such 
a complete interest can be imputed to the owner of the 
servient tenement in the absence of a clear indication 
of such intention. The Railway Company's deed (Plain-
tiff's Exhibit Y) is simply an easement grant non-exclu-
sive in nature. 
Since it is clear that plaintiff owns only an easement 
across defendant's land, the correlative rights of defend-
ant and plaintiff become important. The following quo-
tation from Pasadena v. California Michigarn Land and 
Water Company, supra, is relevant: 
""Where the easement is founded upon a 
grant, as here, only those interests expressed in 
the grant and those necessarily incident thereto 
pass from the owner of the fee. The general rule 
is clearly esta'blished that, despite the granting of 
an easement, the owner of the servient tenement 
may make any use of tl1e land that does not inter-
fere unreasonably with the easement. * * * It is 
not necessary for him to make any reservation to 
protect his interests in the land, for what he does 
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not convey, he still retains. • • • Furthermore, 
since he retains the right to use the land reason-
ably himself, he retains also the power to trans-
fer these rights to third persons. • • • Thus, 
in the instant case, the right of the defendant to 
use the particular land in controversy is derived 
from the owner of the servient tenements, and 
whether it is a permissible use is to be determined 
by whether the owner of the servient tenements 
could have used the land in that manner. ·whether 
a particular use of the land by the servient owner, 
or by someone acting with his authorization, is 
an unreasonable interference is a question of fact 
for the jury." (p. 1191-1192). 
The Supreme Court of Utah in Nielson v. Sandberg, 
141 Pac. (2d) 696, 701, said: 
"A right of way founded urpon a deed or 
grant is limited to the uses, and the extent there-
of as fixed by the grant or deed.'' 
The Railway Company's deed (Plaintiff's Exhibit Y) 
grants a right of way for "reservoirs, dams, ditches, 
conduits, pole lines, and appliances and utilities con-
nected therewith," and therefore the uses and extent 
of such easement is fixed for the purposes stated. By this 
grant the Railway Company did not part ·with the owner-
ship of its land and the defendant as mesne grantee of 
the Railway Company stands in the same position as the 
Railway Company. The following quotation from Big 
Cottonwood Tanne.r Ditch Co. v. Moyle, et al, 109 Utah 
213, (174 Pac. (2d) 148) is pertinent: 
"The rights of the dominant owner are 
limited by the rights of the servient owner. 
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Pioneer Irrigation District v. Smith, 48 Idaho 734, 
285 Pac. 474. Each owner must exercise his right 
so as not unreasonably to interfere with the other 
* • "' In Jenkins v. Depoyster, 299 Ky. 500, 186 
S.\V. (2d) 14, 15, the oourt speaking of the 
easement the mineral rights owner had over ~he 
surface said: 
'' 'The owners must have due regard for 
each other and should exercise that degree of 
care and use which a just consideration for 
the rights of the other demands. It is ele-
mentary that the 1~e of an easement rnust be 
as reasonable and as little burdensome to 
the servient estate as the nature of the ease-
ment and its purpose will >permit.' " (Em-
phasis supplied). 
'l~he Utah Supreme Court had previously announced 
these views in the case of Stevens, et al, v. Bird, 81 Utah 
355, 18 Pac. (2d) 292. There the plaintiffs owned certnjn 
premises with a right of way 17 feet in width made ap-
purtenant thereto Ly grant. 'rhe fee title to this strip of 
land was in the defendant, who used such strip for solely 
as a driveway for ingress and egress to and from other 
property 0\\11ed by it. Plaintiffs sought to limit and 
restrict defendm1t in its use of such drive>vay. They 
contended that by a conveyanee to their predeeessor in 
interest the grantor created an exclusive easement for 
the use and benefit of the premises uow owned by plain-
tiffs, and one other parcel now owned by defendant; that 
the grantor retained nothing but the naked fee, and that 
therefore th@ way may not be used in connection with 
any property other than the two parcels to which it was 
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thus made appurtenant. The deed in question conveyed 
two parcels of land together with perpetual righ_t of way 
for use and benefit of described tracts of land over 17 
foot strip between two parcels. The lower court held for 
the defendant, and plaintiffs appealed. Judgment was 
affirmed. The Court said: 
"In construing instruments creating ease-
ments in land, the court will look to the circum-
stances attending the transaction, the situation of 
the parties, the state of the thing granted, aizd 
the object to be attained, to ascertain and give 
effect to the intention of the parties. Here the 
words 'together with a per,petual right of way for 
use and benefit of above described tracts of land' 
designate the property to which the way was made 
appurtenant and limit the grantees' use of such 
way to the granted premises, but import no limit-
ation upon the right of the grantor to make any 
use of the property not inconsistent with the 
special use for \Vhich the easement was gl·anteJ. 
He (the owner of the servient estate) mav him-
self ~~.se the way, or permit others to do so, sldJ-
ject to the limitation tlwt his WJe or the 1tse of his 
permitee 'l'n-ust not be such as to impair- the enjoy-
'!'nent of the easement by the owner of the domi-
nant estate, or subject him to extra c:J'pcnse in 
keeping it in repair, and it is not n'ecesscw?J tlwt 
lie expressly reserve any such r'i[Jht . . , cmmphasis 
supplied). 
Corpus Juris Secundmn, in fliscussing tht> rights of 
the owner of the servient estate, indicates tlw.t unless he 
expressly agrees to the contrary, the owner of the 
servient estate may n~e his pror)erty in any manner and 
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for any purpose consistent with the enjoyment of the 
easement. The rule above applies to a right of way. 
'Vithout expressly reserving the right, the grantor may 
himself use the way, or permit others to do so, unless the 
rights of the owner of the easement are exclusive, and 
subject to the easement, he may also utilize the space 
a;bove or beneath the surface of the way. (28 CJS Page 
770, Sec. 91). 
The owner of the fee can excavate below the surface 
of the way if thereby he does not interfere with the ease-
ment owners' right of passage. (Kendall v. Ha.rdy, 94 N. 
·E. 254, 208 Mass. 20). 
Similarly, it is held that the acquisition by a muni-
cipal corporation of an easement in a way for the con-
struction of a water conduit, many feet below the surface, 
to be composed of the most durable material does not 
deprive the fee owner of the right to construct the sewer 
above it. (Perley v. Cambridge, 220 Mass. 507, 108 N.E. 
494, LRA, 1915 E, 432). 
Accordingly, where there was granted to the plain-
tiff a right to use a forty-foot road, it was held that he 
coul<l not maintain an action in respect to a portico which 
projected two feet into the carriage way, but left ample 
space for the convenient enjoyment by the plaintiff of the 
way. The question is, can the right of way be substan-
tially exercised as conveniently as before. (Gale on Ease-
ments, page 343, citing H~ttton v. Hamboro, 1860 Surrey 
Summer Assizes, 175 Eng. Reports 1031, 2 F & F, 218). 
The O\vner of land could not be enjoined from plow-
ing in customary manner across pipe line right of way, 
although it might result in unintentional damage to pipe, 
where the deed reserved pipe line and right of way. 
(West Coast Power Co. v. Buttram, 54 Idaho 318, 31 Pac. 
(2d) 687). 
"It is well settled as a general proposition, 
that the owner of the servient estate, may use his 
'Property in any manner and for any purpose con-
sistent with the employment of the easement." 
(Hoyt v. Hart, 149 Cal. 722, 87 Pac. 5G9, 571.) 
"The rule is that every inciclen t of owner-
ship not inconsistent with the easement and the 
enjoyment of the same, is reserved to the grant-
or." (Diers sen v. ~r c.Connac\:, et al, 28 Cnl. App. 
(2d) 16-1, 82 Pac. (2d) 212, 216.) 
"It is elemen tnry that the use of an en semen t 
must be as reasonable and as little burdensome 
to the servieut estate as the rwture of the ease-
ment and the object of it will permit. * * * In this 
case, the la11<lowners, had a perfect right to use 
the strip sought to 'be conclemlled in any way they 
saw fit, including the use of them for the removal 
of coal and timber from the remaining lands, in 
so far as such use did not interfere with the 
reasonable exercise or enjoyment of the easement 
herein sought to be acquired." (Ky. etc. Power 
Co. v. Elkhorn City Land Co., 212 Ky. 62-1, 279 
SvV 1082.) 
"In the instant case the appellee has the ex-
clusive possession of the strip of land taken for 
all purposes necessary to carry into effect an(1 
maintain the tnmsmission line and to no other 
exteilt. Therefore tlw appellant still and docs 
have the right to enter upon the same at all 
reasonable times and for all reasonable purposes 
not inconsistent, or in intHfcrence, with the rights 
of the H'l:pelhe. Appellnut may ccmtjmw to gnnv 
his peach trees, cultivate them, and gather the 
fruit, so long as he does not interfere with the 
property of the appellee or its employees in the 
performance of their legitimate duties." (Patter. 
son Orchard Co. v. Southwest Arkansas Utilities 
Corp., 179 Ark. 1029, 18 SW (2d) 1028, 65 ALR 
1446.)' 
"Thus, except for the reservations made in 
the grant, the owner had the same complete 
dominion and control over this 20 foot strip as he 
had over the remainder of his property." (Lang. 
azo v. San Joaquin Light & Power Company, 90 
Pac. (2d) (DCA, Cal.), 825.) 
The case of Green Mountain Cemetery Company's 
Appeal, 1 Pa. Cs. 371, 4 Atl. 528, supports the rirrht o-~' 
the owner of a servient tenement to remove sand and 
gravel from an easement. See also: Vandalia E. Co. v 
Clay Co·un,ty Rome, 181 Ind. 704, 103 N.E. 1071 and 
Va,ndalia R. Co. v. Wheeler, 181 Ind. 424, 108 N.E. 1069. 
The evidence in this action shows that defendant's 
land is primarily valuable for the purpose of the pro-
duction of sand and gravel for commercial use. Defend-
ant's entire operations involved in this action pertain 
to the excavation and processing of earth material to 
produce sand, grav·el and concrete and road base aggre-
gate. The foregoing authorities support the proposition 
that defendant had the right to use the land within the 
right of way for any purpose in so far as its use thereof 
did not imperil the safety of the conduit in place. The 
easement grant is for the purpose of the construction 
and operation of a water conduit and the duty owed by 





impair this easement grant. Defendant did not part with 
title to the soil within the easement. It remained the 
property of defendant. The court by its mandate pro-
hibits the defendant from using its land for its most 
valuable purpose. The court's order virtually converts 
an easement into a fee simple grant without compensat-
ing defendant for the differenoes in value between value 
of the easement and the value of the fee simple owner-
ship. 'The provisions of the judgment under discussion 
are entirely too 'broad when they attempt to forbid de-
fendant from excavating on its own land and in requir-
ing it to fill its excavations when made. The utmost 
thrust of the court's power is to prohibit defendant from 
doing any act which would threaten the safety of the 
conduit. 
"The Court may properly take into con-
sideration the extent to which the use of the re-
spective properties will be affected by the issuance 
or r·efusal of the injunction. If the usc of plain-
tiff's p:roperty is not prevented, lmt only render·ed 
slightly less vaht~able, while the injunction would 
prevent the defenda·nf fr·om 1tsing his property 
for its only valuable p-urpose, the court should 
deny the injurn.ction." (~fcClintock on Equity, Sec. 
140) (Emphasis supplied). 
In speaking of mandatory injunctions, Pomeroy de-
clares the balance of injury should be considered when 
a mandatory injunction is sought. (5 Pomeroy's Equity 
.Jurisprudence, Sec. 1966, Page 4468, Citing Hall v. Road, 
40 Mich. 46, 26 Am. Rep. 528). 
This general principle was followed in the case of 
Winters v. T'tt'tner, (74 Utah 222, 278 Pac. 816). In that 
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case, defendant's cattle trespassed on the plaintiff's land. 
Speaking of injunction restraining the defendant, the 
Court said: 
"But an injunction is a purely equitable 
remedy and ought not to be issued except in aid 
of equity." 
The facts showed that 1plaintiff's land was in and among 
public lands, that plaintiff's land was unfenc,ed; and if an 
injunction issued it would restrain the defendant in ef-
fect, from using the public lands. The court in denying 
the injunction said: 
''The oompa.rative convenience or inconveni-
ence of the parties from granting or withholding 
an injunction sought should be considered, and 
none should be granted if it would operate oppres-
sively, or inequitably or contra.ry to the real jus-
tice of the oase." 
This principle is also stated by the Supreme Court 
of Utah in the case of Mary Jane Stevens Co. v. First 
National Building Company, 89 Ut. 456, 57 Pac. (2d) 
1099, where it was held that even though there is no 
laches and clear case~ of trespass, as by an encroachment 
of adjoining landowner's building, court will always con-
sider equities between parties, ~and under some circum-
stances will balwnce 'convenience and itnj-wries and deny 
I 
mandatory injurnction, if causing great injury t1o adjoin,. 
ing land1owner with little or no benefit to plaintiff. 
2. There is no evidence in the record that such 
removal by defendant of soil, etc., did imperil the 
safety of said conduit. 
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There has been quoted above the testimony of both 
the defendant and plaintiff which is relevant to the pro-
visions of the judgment now being questioned. It is sub-
mitted that this evidence fails to disclose any immediate 
or present threat to the safety of the conduit. The ex-
plantation given by Mr. ·walker as to what occurred 
within the alleged and uncertain boundaries of the right 
of way stands undisputed. It is apparent that the dis-
turbance to the surface soil was hut a temporary occur-
rence arising out of the preliminary operations for ex-
cavating soil material lower down on the slope toward 
vV asatch Boulevard. J\Ir. \Valker states definitely that no 
soil was removed within the, 33 feet which tlw court er-
roneously assumed was in the right of ·way. 'l'he soil re-
moval occurred 60 feet from the center of the conduit on 
a 90 foot front. The indentations and marks within the 
33 foot limit were those of the bulldm:er. However, if 
it be assumed that soil material was removed wi,tl!in the 
33 foot limit, the following testimony of Mr. \Valker is 
highly illuminating: 
"Q. (By Mr. Riter) 'l'he City alleges, in Para-
graph 7 of its complaint, that you removed 
4480.9 cubic yards of material which would re-
quire replacement in that area descriLed as 
being the genei·al area involved in this action. 
Have you made a computation, and are you 
able to testify as to that yardage'? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. Ho\v much is it, according to your computa-
tion and opiuion 'I 
A.. Assuming that there was eig:!J teen inclws OV('l' 





ing the eight feet which they claim has not 
been disturbed, whieh would leave an area 
of twenty-three feet to their right-of-way, by 
approximately eighty feet in length, paral-
leling their conduit-now, if you assume that 
material was all deposited uniformly around 
the conduit, which is on a curve at that point, 
so that eighteen inches were taken off, there 
would he approximately one hundred two 
cubic yards involved in that area. 
Q. Not forty-four hundred 1 
A .. No. 
Q. (By the Court) Eighteen inches deep over 
a length of eighty feet long, and what else T 
A. Twenty-three f·eet wide. I can check tha:t in 
a minute. 
(Computation by witness.) 
A. (Continued) There are 1840 square feet, 
and the ma,terial is a foot and a half for 2760 
cubic feet-that would be 102.22 .cubic yards. 
Q. 102.22 cubic yards 1 
A. Yes sir." (R. 67.) 
This disturbance was of minor and temporary nature 
which is entirely over-emphasized by the provisions of 
the judgment which should be entirely eliminated or else 
radically modified. As they now stand defendant is 
deprived of use of property which it owns. As heretofore 
stated, these provisions found their way into the judg-
ment because of the erroneous assumption as to the width 
oi the right of way. 
IV. 
THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 5 OF THE 
JUDGMENT DATED SEPTEMBER 1, 1949, ARE 
ERRONEOUS AND NOT CONSISTENT WITH 
. -FINDING 14 WHICH PURPORTS TO SUPPORT 
SAID PROVISION OF SAID JUDGMENT. 
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The plaintiff's testimony shows that the conduit was 
constructed in a trench which follocvved the contour of the 
hillside through Sections 24 and 25. (R-451, 455). The 
trench was dug by hand labor (R-451) and teams and 
scra!pers (R-456). In excavating it the dirt was thrown 
on the lower ·side, that is, on the side nearest \V asatch 
Boulevard. vVhen the trench was back-filled, soil from 
the east side of the trench was used (R 45G). From this 
evidence it is clear that the slopes immediately below the 
conduit, at the time of'trial, vvere not natural slopes, as 
they had 15een changed and altered by the spill :of soil 
from the conduit trench. :Slopes in their "natural" con-
dition must mean slopes which came into being as a result 
of the for.ces ofnature, and not slopes which existed after 
they had been disturbed by the hand of man. This dis-
turbanc•e would be r_epresented hy either removing soil 
fr•om the position in wl:lich it had been deposited by 
nature or by covering the natnral depcisitrons of soil 
. -
with overburden such as was done in constructing the 
conduit trench. 'I'her:e ean be no question but what the 
natural slopes. immedi_ately adjoining the C'Onduit on the 
West toward ·wasatch Boulevard as it crossed Sections 
24 a~Cl 25, had been changed by deposition of soil re-
moved from the conduit trench. The evidence does not 
clearly i~diCate how far from the \~est ~ide of the conduit 
this additronal soil deposition occurred, although Mr. 
Staker in his testimony makes it clear that it was sub-
stantial: 
"Q. (By Mr. Allen) Mr. Staker you testified that 
you worlmd along 4 or 5 miles of the conduit 
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beginning at a point where water enters it 
now? 
A. That is right. 
Q. Going north and wesU 
A. Yes. 
Q. You say that the trench along part of that 
area was rather de,ep 1 
A. It was. 
Q. How deep would you say it was at the deepest 
point in any section along there 7 
A. I would s·ay, just off hand, that it must have 
been at least 12 or 15 feet because the accumu-
lation as we threw it over would get so high 
we had to have a man on the bank to get the 
dirt and he would shove it over the bank.'' 
R. 458, 459). 
·we may therefore conclude that the slopes immediately 
adjoining the -conduit on the west have been altered by 
the hand of man, and that such alteration existed all 
through the years since the conduit was constructed, 
and also existed at the time of the trial of this a.ction. 
1. The provisions of Paragraph 5 of sa!d judg-
ment is based upon "the natural slopes as they ex-
isted on January 1, 1948, and where they "had not 
been altered by man," as opposed to the provision 
of said finding wh£ch is based upon "such slopes, 
with their natural mantle of vegetation and rock as 
presently existing." 
p,aragraph 5 of the judgment recites: 
''In addi·tion to the earth materials that de-
fendant may remove as provided elsewhere in this 
decree, where the natural slopes as they existed on 
J·anuary 1st, 19,!8, and where they had not been 
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altered by man, existed at a pitch steeper than 
two feet horizontal to one foot vertical, and where 
said slopes with a pitch steeper than two to one as 
aforesaid continue downward until they meet a 
gentler slope and where a said steeper sl01pe above 
said gentler slope has an average uniform and 
continuous pitch of at least fifty feet between 
point "X 1 ' on Exhibit "A" above the said con-
duit and a gentler sl'ope, the defendant or inter-
venor is not prohibited from removing earth mate-
rials from the said gentler slope, provided that the 
arera disturbed is dressed by the party disturbing 
the sarne and provided by said party with a 
growth of vegetation comparable to the vegetation 
on the srope above said disturbed area, within one 
year from the commei1ecment of the distnrhance 
of said slope. Defendant and intervrenor are en-
joined from creating, in the rcni6va1 of the mate-
rial described in this paragraph of this decree, a 
·· pitc.h steeped than the said ave:rage pitch of at 
least fifty feet down from 1point "X" above the 
conduit in the said area disturbed." . . 
The suppOJ"ting finding ?f fact is No.14, which r~ads 
in_ part as ~ ollgws : 
"~ "" * the court finds that where the existing 
slopes below plaintiff's right of way are not now 
disturbed by defendant's workings and such slopes 
have a pitch steeper than 2 feet horizontal to 1 
foo't vertical, such slopes, with their natural 
mantle of vegetalion and rock as presently exist-
ing are found by the court to be slopes of safety 
to plaintifFs condriit and right of 'vay so far as 
defendant's or intervenor's responsibility for the 
safety of said conduit is concerned. That where 
such steeper than 2 foet to 1 foot slopes on their 
downw:ucl course from ';Jhrintiff's ~[lid conduit 
meet a less steep but uniform slope below and 
such steeper slope is uniform and continuous in 
pitch for a slope distance of at least 50 feet be-
tween the said point "X" on Exhibit "A" above 
the conduit and said gentler slope, the court finds 
that a continuation of such steeper slope at the 
same pitch of said slope existing above said more 
gentler slope into and beyond said gentler slol:e 
will provide a slope of safety ior plaintiiTs con-
duit and right of way, provided elc. * * *" 
Comparing the provision of the judgment with the 
provision of the finding, a difference is discovered. The 
judgment refers to "natural slopes as they existed on 
January 1, 1948, and where they had, not been, altered by 
man." The finding refers to "existing slopes below 
plaintiff's right of way'~ '" *not disturbed by defendant's 
workings * '» * with their natural mantle of vegetation 
and rock as presently existing." This description of the 
slopes is definitely tied to the provision following in the 
next sentence "where such steeper than 2 f,eet to 1 foot 
slopes on their downward course from plaintiff's said 
conduit meet a less steep lmt uniform slope below." In 
the judgment these sloP'eS are those that not only ex-
isted on January 1, 1948, but also "where they had not 
been altered 'by man.'' In the finding these slopes are 
defined as those "with their natural mantle of vegetation 
and rock as presently existing.'' (The judgment was 
signed September 1, 1949). The conrt was describing 
both in the judgment and the findings, the same slopes 
and not different sl>01pes. 
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2. The slopes described in said finding are 
slopes which were altered by the spilling of material 
in digging the conduit trench and the Utah Light and 
Railroad Company flume bench. 
"The presently existing" slopes of the findings have 
been altered 'by the hand of man because the evidence 
shows clearly that they had received the soil resulting 
f:rom 'the exca,vation of the conduit trench. Their sur-
faces had been thus changed and their incline planes 
altered. Mr. Stal\!er's testimony quoted above indicates 
that there must have been substantial alteration in these 
incline plane's of the naturtal slope's as they existed prior 
to the deposition of the trench spill. The provision of 
the judgment is restricted to such slopes "where they had 
not been1 altered by man." It is difficult if not impossiMe 
to reconcile the slopes of the judgment with the slopes 
of the finding. rrhe question is whether or not this dif-
ference in definition of slopes prejudices the rights of 
the defendant with res1pect to soil removal. 
3. The provisions of paragraph 5 of the judg-
ment are therefore broader than correlative provi-
sions of said finding 14, and deprives defendant of 
the right to remove material from the area desig-
nated in said finding as being above the slopes of 
safety of both the right of way and co,nduit. 
It is manifest from a study of the relevant provi-
sions of Finding 14 and of Paragraph 5 of the judgment 
that the court recognized the fact that he was making 
a decree which covered not only defendant's then present 
workings (.an area having about 94 feet lateral measure-
men't along the line of the conduit and extending fan 
shape down to Wasatch Boulevard) but also the remain-
der of defendant's ·land where no operations were 
heing conducted. He also recognized that the evidence 
shows that along the conduit line westerly from de-
fendant's present workings neither the conduit nor the 
right of way are uniformly supported by 2 to 1 slopes 
or llh to 1 slopes but by numerous s'}opes of much steeper 
pitch. 'l'hese areas as stated had not been worked by de-
fendant and were in a condition as they had existed for 
years. 'l'he court therefore devised a plan whereby he 
adopted these slopes having a. pitch stee:IJer than 2 to 1 
or even llh 'to 1, if they extended f'or at least 50 feet he~ 
tween point "X" on Exhibit "A" and a gentler s}ope 
below the conduit, as slopes of safety for the conduit. By 
such scheme he permitted the defendant to remove soil 
beyond the 50 foot limit down to an underlying sl'ope 
which was steeper than 2 to 1 •and llh to 1, if the pitch 
of ·that slope represented only an extension of the steep'er 
slope as it existed from poin't "X" abov.e the etonduit to 
the 50 f.oot limit. 'l'he quoted portion of Finding 14 there-
fore was based ·on the recognition that along the line 
of the conduit the slopes within the 50 foot limit had been 
altered by c·asting trench spill U!fJOn them. Theref·ore 
they had been ''altered by man.'' 'I' he finding obviously 
intended to use these s}opes extending outward of 50 feet 
from point "X" on Exhibit "A" as the slopes which 
could 'be extended downward as the slopes of safety. 
While the exact results 'Of spilling trench material on the 
slopes as they existed prior to excavating the trench, 
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cannot he ascertained, it is clear that substantial alter-
ati'on in their pitch must have occurred as a result of the 
addition of this trench dirt. When it came to implement-
ing this part of the finding by the judgment the court 
r~stricted its effect to those slopes which had not been 
altered by man. By this restriction he therefore elimi-
nated vast areas of the defendant's land from this saving 
provisi'On. It is doubtful whether or not there exists any 
slopes in defendant's land that were not in some degree 
changed hy the spill of trench soil upon them. 'rhe court 
in its findi'ng clearly intended to ameliorate the strin-
gency of its pro,posed decree, but in the drafting of the 
decree the court virtually eliminated this ameliorating 
provision of the finding. As the judgment stands the de-
fendant at its peril must detennine whether or not with-
in the 50 foot limit there is any area where the trench soil 
was no't spilled on the slope. It is only in these areas, if 
any exist, that it can excavate materbl 'below the 30 foot 
limit to the surface of this steeper slope, extending into 
the gentler slope. 'rherefore the quoted provision of the 
judgment is broader in its op{'rative effect than the court 
intended by its finding. The result is that the judgment 
takes away from defendant a valuable right which the 
court intended to confer upon it by the finding. The 
provision of the judgment therefore is not supported by 
any consistent finding. 
v. 
FINDINGS 12, 14 AND 15, AND THE PROVI-






JUDGMENT, ARE ERRONEOUS IN THAT THEY 
DISTINGUISH BETWEEN A SLOPE OF SAFETY 
FOR THE CONDUIT AND A SLOPE OF SAFETY 
FOR THE RIGHT OF WAY. 
Finding 12 declares: 
"That to give ip•roper and adequate security 
to plaintiff's right of way for said conduit re-
quires a slope' •of not less than 1 foot horizontal 
to 1 foot vertieal at the outer edge of said right 
of ·way, which is closer to Wasatch Boulevard, 
which said slope, beginning at such outer edge, 
is herein designated as the right of way slope 
as distinguished from the slope which the court 
has referred to herein as the slope of safety for 
said conduit. But such slope of 1 foot horizontal 
to 1 foot vertical is hereby found to be a slope 
of safety for s•aid right of way only when it is 
protected by a mantle of shrubs and vegetation 
after proper dressing to _remove protruding 
boulders and filling in the holes, swales and 
other depressions and making a uniform smooth 
sl'ope." 
Finding 14 provides in part: 
''The court in these findings has distinguish-
ed between n slope of safety for the plaintiff's 
right of way and a slope of safety for plaintiff's 
conduit on said right of wa.y. The court finds 
that to maintain a .. slope of safety fm said right 
of way such slope should commence at the outer 
edge of said right of way which outer edge in the 
grounu is perpendicularly below· a point 33 feet 
on a horizon tal pJ.ane on t from and at right angles 
to the center line of plaintiff's conduit, and go 
clown the slope fron1 that point to the point where 
it intersects the more gentle slope of the slope of 
safety for s·aid conduit; that to -maintain a slope 
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of safety for said conduit such slope should com-
mence at a point 2 f·e·et vertically above the outer 
upper corner of the conduit, which is the upper 
corner closest to ·wasatch Boulevard, such sl01pe 
to continue downward until it reaches 'Said 
W a:satch Boulevard; that the slope of safety 
required for said right of way is steeper in 'terms 
of horizontal to vertical measurements, 'or the 
degree of 'slope, than that required for the slope 
of safety for said conduit, the two slopes, how-
ever, having their commencement point at differ-
ent points as hereinabove indicated* * *." 
Finding 15 1by aid of Exhibit" A" presents a graphic 
demonstration of the material that may be removed by 
defendant in its opemtions and thereby the court pro-
ceeds to define the slopes of safety of the right of way 
as well as the slopes of s~afety for the conduit. 
Paragraph 4 of the judgment is based on fmding 
15 and implements the same. Paragraph 5 of the judg-
ment appJies alike to the slopes of safety of the right 
of way and the 'slopes of safety of the conduit. 
Paragraph 3 of the judgment restrains defendant 
from removing soil material from the slope below plain-
tiff's right of way and conduit, which removal will 
disturb the slope below plaintiff's right of way and 
conduit 1by increasing the pitch of the slope to a steeper 
uniform slope than a slope measuring 2 feet horizontal 
to 1 foot vertical below said right of way beginning at 
the outer edge of said right of way and slopirng down-






1. The grants of the right of way were for a 
water conduit and such right of way is therefore 
limited to the uses and extent thereof fixed by said 
grants. Plaintiff is the.refore entitled to receive sup-
port for said conduit only. 
The deed from Haynes (Plaintiff's Exhibit "X") 
granted to Salt Lake City "a perpetual right of way 
for water conduit.'' The Railway Company's deed con-
veyed to the plaintiff "a right of way and e•asement f'or 
all reservoirs, dams, ditches, conduits, pole lines and 
ruppliun,c.es and utHities connected therewith." Both 
deeds conveyed an easement for the purpose of eon-
structing and operating thereon a water conduit. The 
grant therefore, in each instance, is restricted t'o the 
purpose of the grant, to-wit: the c~onstructron, operation 
and maintenance of a wa:ter conduit. (See authorities 
cited under Point III, sub-heading 1.) Since the ease-
ment is for the specific and restricted purpose of a con-
duit, it would seem logically to follow under the authori-
ties cited that the duty and obligation of tho owner of 
the servient tenement is to afford support to the conduit 
as it is now in place. The right ·of lateral support for 
public works, like milroads and canals, seems t~o be 
incident to them as it is to lands, but .mch a public works 
has no right to lateral support of its structure beyond 
the land taken or a1ppropriated for it unless the same 
is granted by the act cre,ating the work or by the con-
tract with the land owner. ( Washbu.rn on Real Pro1pr8rty, 
page 590, referring to M etropolitan1 Works v. Metro-
politan Railroad, LR 3 CP 612, 62'4). The law of lateral 
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!'UpporJ as applied· to easements r'emains obscure because 
of the lack ·of definitive decisions although as Washburn 
states it ''seems to be i~ident to them." Probably the 
reason for 1a paucity of authorities specifically applying 
the law of lateral support to easements, is due to the 
fact that such a.n issue may be resolved between the 
owner of the doniinant tenement and the owner of the 
se.rvient tenement hy applying the general rule as to the 
obligations and duties of the owner of th.e servient tene-
rrient'toward the owner of tlie dominant t~enement. As the 
authorities cited herein pl'ove,the owner of the servient 
tenement must respect the rights of the owner of the 
dominant tenement by not connnitting nny act which 
will interrupt, obstruct or impajr the free use of the 
easement by the owner thereof. 'J1he application of this 
rule in the instant case would prohibit the defendant 
from doing any act which would injure the conduit 
or in reasonable probability threaten its safety. Stated 
otherwise, the defendant must not in using its own land 
produce a condition whicli destroys or would with rea-
sona:ble expectation destroy the -effectiveness of the eon-
duit. 
2. The evidence shows that the condu:t wiU 
receive adequate support if the slopes of safety com-
mence at a point 8 to 15 feet from the center line of 
the conduit. . . . 
The plaintiff, over 40 yeats ago, selected the route 
of this conduit and built it upon this route, and there 
it lias remitined during tl1e iutervenin~ xca rs. There 
has been but little maintenance work performed on the 
conduit. The berms on the western side, if any ever 
existed, have all but disappeared. At several points the 
C'onduit remains exposed (R. 673). Under this state of 
the evidence the space occupied by the conduit, approx-
imately 41f2 feet in width, seems to fix the width 
of the easement necessary for the support of the conduit. 
It may well have been that the plaintiff has been rather 
careless in the maintenance of this conduit and that it 
should have made greater effort in its preserva.tion. 
It is apparently upon this basis that witnesses fo:r the 
defendant fixed the width of the berm along the west 
edge of the conduit. The witness Craven testified: 
"Q. (By Mr. Riter) : Mr. Craven, as a result of 
your observation, study and examination 
made at the vValker workings, have you 
formed any opinion as to the slope that 
should be maintained immediately below the 
conduit, at this gravel pit, in order to pro-
vide necessary stability and safety for the 
Big Oottonwood conduit~ Answer 'yes' or 
'no.' 
A. Yes. 
Q. State your conclusion, please. 
A. My conc:lusion is that the slope would be llf2 
to 1 slope, particularly in running the em-
bankment. There might be s'Olne erosion 
through tha:t area, but in the immediate area 
under discussion here, a 11f2 to 1 slope would 
stand, taking into consideration that there 
will be some erosion on that slope, it would 
still remain S'afe over a long period of time, 
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excerpt under conditions which it is impos-
sible to design for, such as earthquake, or 
flood or cloudbursts, of such proportions that 
it would wash the natural material in that 
area, to a large extent. 
Q. In or'der to afford this necessary stability 
and safety for U1e conduit, where should this 
11j2 to 1 slope commence"? 
A. In my judgment it should start at a point 
far enough out from the west edge of the 
conduit, to allow for a cover of two feet for 
the conduit; and, in making a rough com-
putation of that, and producing a slope that 
'becomes tangent to a small curve on the west-
erly edge of the conduit, I arrive at a figure 
of 8112 feet from the bottom of the base out 
to where the slope is. 
Q. That would represent the bErm, then? 
A. That would represcmt the berm, opposite the 
west edge of the bot tom of the eondui t. 
Q. Would that make any diiTerence if you take 
the top of the eomlni t from that benn? 
A. 'l'he 111-'2 to 1 should be estahllsl1ecl so tl1at 
it would take it up to the toe of the conduit, 
where the two feet cover would go. 
Q. ·where would the ho ttolll ol' that s lor1w ho "? 
A. On that computaliou that slope would ron-
tinue clown the hill until it met the natural 
slope of the ground, where the embankments 
were being made, and when' the material 
belo~w the eondnit 'vas not clistnrbecl." (H. 
804--805) 
Dr. Ferdinand F. Hintze ti~t>tified on this Issue as 
follows: 
"Q. (By Mr. Riter): Dr. Hintze, based on your 
observation, and based upon your testimony 
of an average s}ope-in some of the slopes 
1.48-based also upon your study, based also 
upon the history of this deposit, based also 
upon the physical condition of the conduit 
as it exists over and across the vValker land, 
would you say that a slope on the Walker 
working of VIz to 1 is ddequate to provide 
for that conduit the protection, a reasonably 
adequate protecti'on? 
A. I think a VIz slope to 1, would be as safe, 
or safer, than the n·atural slopes that are 
present adjacent to the \\Talker workings. 
Q. (By the Court) : If that slo,pe were left as a 
1¥2 to 1, would that increase the City's main-
tenanC{) problem~ 
A. I don't believe it would. 
Q. That burden 1 
A. No sir, I don't believe it would. 
Q. (By Mr. Holmgren) : ·will you fu the place 
where he is starting this slope 1 Are you 
going to go from the bottom of the eonduit 
or to the top, or where do you start? 
Q. (By :Mr. Riter) : Conforming to 1\fr. Holm-
gren's request, I ask you where would you 
fix the beginning point of the 1lf2 to 1 slope? 
A. I would say, in view of the fact that the 
c'over of the conduit has not been fully main-
tained, it has been washed off there, in the 
place on the south side of this spot, which 
I have now referred to, and has not been 
maintained, that it apparently is not con-
sidered to be an immediate hazard for a 
little of the upper corner of this conduit to 
be exposed, and I would think that :if the con-
duit cover, a.s it now is there, were preserved, 
a slope beginning, say, at the upper west edge 
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of the conduit-that is the upper edge of 
the conduit 'on the west side, the lower side, 
if a sl'ope hegins there and leaves the said 
covering and whatever covering there is on 
the top, there, that that would be adequate, 
that would be, as long as that is not washed 
away, that there would he no possible chance 
of any danger to the conrlnit." (R. 678-679). 
Reconcilement of the testimony of defendant's wit-
nesses with that of the plaintiff's witnesses is not diffi-
cult. It is a.pparent upon reading the testimony of City 
Engineer Beers (R. 249) that his opinion rests entirely 
upon his assumption that the city possessed a 66 foot 
right of way. He stated that he would start the slope of 
safety at the edge of the right of way 33 feet from the 
center of the conduit (R. 248-249). The following inter-
esting colloquy between the court and J\Ir. Beers clearly 
confirms this assumption: 
"THE COURT: ::\[r. Holmgren, he sta.te'd 
that the two tro one should be maintained from a 
point 33 feet ont from the center of the conduit. 
He did not say .in reference to the elevation 
whether the center of the bottom or the cenh~r 
of the top, or half way up. If you are talking 
:rbout lateral support, that might be important. 
"Q. \Vhat point did you have in mind? 
A. I had in mind that we had a right to set 
out a right-of-way :;;; feet wide. \Ve have a 
right to maintain that material in its present 
condition." (R 231) 
Later on the following interclwngl:' occurreu: 
"Q. (By the Court): The thirty-three feet out, 
is that from the top of the conduit or the 
bottom or the middle 7 
A. From the middle. 
Q. It is a question of elevation in the middle. 
You me~an half-way up the conduit¥ 
A. I don't understand your question. The hill 
has a slope. I assume you have a right-of-
way of 33 feet. You have to take that slope 
where it hits in horizontally, that distance 
out. It may be h'orizontal, hut as far as that 
slope hits. 
THE COURT: If that testimony is based on 
what he thinks is the right-of-way, I c:ould not 
consider his testimony, because it is not based 
on a slope of necessity or need, but it is based 
on what he thinks the city had a deed to." (R. 
252) 
L~ater the record shows : 
(Mr. Riter) As he [Beers] is testifying, he 
mixes engineering and law, principally. If the 
court please, I don't think he is qualified on 
that. \Ve are admitting his qualifications as an 
engineer, 'hut when he mixes his law and his engi-
neering, I object to that. 
THE COURT: rrhe objection is sustained. 
If he is basing it on what the grHnt happens to be 
right now, that is a long way from what he is 
qualified t·o answer. It is a questi'on of what is 
nec~ssary, not what he has as a matter of grant.'' 
(R. 253) 
Notwithstanding Mr. Beer's opinion, which was 
obviously based upon the assumption that the city owned 
the 33 feet right of way, the witness Gardner, assistant 
city engineer, made this startling declaration: 
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"Q. How far out should the sl-o1pe start1 
A. I would say the slope-that would depend 
entirely on the erosion. 
Q. Well, right here on this section'? 
Q. (By Hiter) ln the critical section we are 
dealing with. 
A. I would say that it should start not less than 
15 feet out. We should have a 15 foot berm, 
not less than that, anywhere. 
Q. (By the Court) l;) feet out from the center 
line of the bottom of the conduit, from there 
on what would yoiu safety slope require? 
A. I would say not lc;:.;s than two t'o one. 
Q. (By ,\fr. Riter) 'l1 hat is your testimony~ 
A. 'l'hat is my testimony." ( R. 217) 
Professor .1\farsell, the star witness for plaintiff, 
expressecl this opinion: 
"Therefore, 1 think that even that slope 
would have to he maintained by additions through-
out the years, as protection to replace the mate-
rial removed by erosion. Therefore, I would want 
to see a berm wide enough for, I would say, ten 
or twelve feet . or more along- the conduit line, 
on the down slope side, with a rounded shoulder, 
and a slope of 2 to 1 from there on down to the 
plane that would i1~tersect tfw County highway." 
(R. 347) 
The evidence of both plaintiff and defendant there-
fore appears to sustain the conclusion that the conduit 
will receive adequate support if the siopes of saftety 
commence at a point 8 to 15 feet from the center line 
of the conduit. This will provide a berm of adequate 
width not only for the maintenance and repair of the 
conduit hut as a po<iirt of commencement of the slopes 
of safety. 
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S. The Court's findings relat:ve to slopes of 
safety for the right of way and provisions of the 
judgment based thereon are extraneous to the issues 
in this case and deprive defendant of material which 
otherwise would have been available to it above the 
slopes of safety of the conduit. 
'The primary and fundamental concern of the plain-
tiff is to maintain its conduit in a safe o:perating condi-
tion. It is entitled to prevent su,ch disturbances o.f the 
soil condition in the proximity' of the conduit which 
threaten with a reasonable degree of probability the 
stability of th'e conduit. 'The issue, in this case as framed 
by the pleadings pertains to the safety 'of the eonduit 
and not the safety of the right of way. It is neWwr 
necessary nor legally proper to detJermine the slopes 
of safety of the right of way. That is an extraneous 
issue which has only remote, if any, bearing on the vital 
issue in this litigation. This question at this point cross'es 
the question as to the width of the right of way in Sec-
tion 25. The width of the necessary berm undoubtedly 
has a direct bearing in determining the width of the 
right of way in Section 2~5. The evidence appears to 
point in the direction of the conclusion that the width 
of the right of way in Section 25 is 30 feet, viz., 15 feet 
on each side of the c1ente~ line of the conduit. However, 
with the width of the right of way in Section 25 unde-
termined, the question as to a slope of safety for the 
right of way was never reached, and no finding on this 
point should haV'e been made. 
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As to the right of way in Section 24, its width was 
determined hy the Haynes grant, but the absence of 
evidenee as to the location of the conduit on the right 
of way also produces a situation where the question 
as t·o the slope of safety of the right of way is extrane-
ous to the issues in this case. In Section 24 the plaintiff 
also seeks to protect the conduit, and it is the slope of 
safety of the conduit which is an issue. Even with the 
width of the right of way in Sec,tion 2-! clef1nitelyfixed by 
the grant, an issue as to a slope of safety of the right 
of way has no 'bearing on the question as to the slope 
of safety of the conduit. It must be remembered that 
the easement in Section 24 was for the specific purpose 
of constructing and maintaining a conduit and for no 
other purpose, therefor'e the issue pertains solely to a 
slope of safeity for the conduit. 
VI. 
mE JUDGMENT IS INDEFINITE, VAGUE 
AND AMBIGUOUS AND IMPOSSIBLE OF COM-
PLIANCE BY THE DEFENDANT AND INTER-
VENOR. 
The defendant, pursuant to Paragraph 7 of the judg-
ment, applied to the .court for authority to serve and file 
its applicatron for a suipplementa1 judgment requiring the 
plaintiff to mark and stake upon the ground the west 
boundary line of its i·ight of way easement as same ex-
tends across Section 24 and 25 aforesaid, when the width 
of the right of way easement across sai'd Section 25 is 
determjned by the court and also to require the plaintiff 
to make certain cross section surveys over. defendant's 
land below plaintiff's conduit, and t'O file in the court and 
cause the field notes thereof and other proper maps and 
records of such surveys. (R-95, 96, 97, 102). The court 
denied defendant's motion. 
The future administration of the court's judgment 
in this case is of great importance both to the plaintiff 
and defendant. The court has retained jurisdiction over 
the case in order "to modify, enlarge, or otherwise 
change the terms hereof, for the protection of plaintiff's 
said conduit and right of way.'' (Paragraph 7 J udg-
ment). 'I'he factual situation presented by the exhaustive 
evidence is clearly indicative of the promise of situations 
arising in the future, which will demand that the court 
exercise this continuing jurisdiction without putting 
defendant to the risk of contempt of court in order to 
'Protect the plaintiff's conduit and also to prevent the 
judgment from acting as an instrument of confiscation 
of defendant's land. This is an entirely proper funct.:on 
of a court of equity and is not unusual in judgments of 
this nature. 
It is the claim of defendant that notwithstanding the 
elaborate exhibits in this case and the information fur-
nished by witnesses that there should be made a part of 
the records of this case certain vital and statistical in-
formation for future use and reference. 'I'he judgment 
was signed and filed September 1, 1949. The defendant 
believes that ail parties to this action are entitled to the 
preservation for future reference, data and cross section 
surveys which will definitely reveal as of said date, the 
contours of the slopes on defendant's land below the con-
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duit. 'fhis informati'on is of particular importance in 
view of the alternative method of operation offered the 
defendant and intervenor by Paragraph 4 of the judg-
ment. 
The fact must be emphasized that at the time of the 
trial'of thi1s action, only a very small part of defendant's 
land had been worked. The actual opera6'on had been 
conducted in an area which measured approximately 
94 feet laterally along the line of the conduit and thence 
fanning out in the direction of \Vasatch Boulevard below. 
Defendant's Exhibit 47 is a map of the !property in this 
area over which defendant may in the future operate. 
The C'ourt's judgment covers not only the small area 
which had been actively excavated up to the date of 
the judgment, but also all of the property of defendant 
below the eonduit. Compared with prospective operations 
the operations within the 94 foot fan are very small. 
Defendant is concerned with its futllre operations over 
more extended areas. 
If at ·some future date one of the parties to this 
action applies to the court for a modification of its judg-
ment beyond all peradventure the factual question will 
arise as to the actual conditions on the ground at the 
time the judgment became effective. For this reason the 
defendant asserts that the court should have directed that 
immediate surveys be made in order to supply a basis 
of fact for fnture adjustments of the judgment. 
The defendant 01perates under this judgment at its 
peril. It is therefore entitled to have placed in the record, 
official informntion ns to the conditions preYailing at the 
time of judgment. Without such infonnation which was 
procured under the 'Order of the court and which would 
stand as part of the official record of the court, the 
defendant will be prejudiced and damaged in the future 
use of its land. Conditions may arise where it will be 
a disputed issue 'Of fact as to whether, for example, a 
given piece of excavation comes within the authorization 
of Paragraph 5 of the judgment. The court certainly 
possesses the power to secure this information and to 
apportion the costs thereof between the plaintiff, de-
fendant and intervenor. There was certainly nothing 
unreasonable in defendant's petition for this relief. The 
necessity for the compilation and impounding of this in-
formation is emphasized by other considerations herein 
submitted. 
1. There is no requirement in said judgment 
that a survey shall be made whereby the location of 
the boundary line of plaintiff's right of way on the 
side nearest W'asatch Boulevard will be determined 
so that same way may be marked upon the ground 
and the record thereof preserved in the court's file 
in this action. 
The a:hsence from the judgment of the location of the 
west boundary line of plaintiff'rs right of way is the direct 
result of the court's refusal to adjudicate such question 
under defendant's application authorized by Paragraph 
6 of the judgment. The marking of the western boundary 
line of the conduit in Section 24 would be an inexpensive 
engineering operation because the right of way over that 
section is 66 feet wide. Obviously the markihg 'Of the 
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boundary line in the section would expedite operations 
under the judgment. 
There has been discussed at length in this brief the 
refusal of the court to define the width of the right of 
way over Section 2:5. In this section in particul'ar is it 
vital that the width of this right of way he determined 
and marked upon the ground. The failure or refus·al of 
the court to make a definitive finding of fact on this issue 
produces an error that runs through the entire judgment 
· with respect to Section 25, and produces an ambiguity 
and uncertainty which makes the judgment almost im-
pos'sible of 'administration. If the court had determined 
the width of 'this right of way and caused the western 
boundary thereof to he marked on the ground, and had 
ordered appropriate cross section surveys to be made 
and recorded, questions as to whether or not future oper-
ations 'Of the defendant violated or confonned to the !fll'O-
visions of the judgment would present no insurmountable 
issue of fact. 
2. There is no requh'ement in said judgment 
that a survey shall be made whereby the location of 
the center line of plaintiff's conduit will be deter-
mined so that same may be marked upon the ground 
and the record thereof preserved in the court's file 
in this action .. 
Ref~rence to Exhibit ''A'' of the judgment reveals 
how vital the information as to the location of the center 
line of the conduit is in ascertaining slopes of safety of 
the conduit. This is information which should be pre-
served in the official records of this case and it is not a 
burden which should be cast upon the defendant -and in-
tervenor alone. The plaintiff ha;s an equal interest in the 
preservation of such evidence. It must be remembered 
that the defendant has as great a right to use its land 
for lawfu'l purposes as the plaintiff has to maintain the 
integrity of its conduit. The mechanizing of operati'ons 
under the court's judgment is not a mere matter of con-
venience for the defendant; it is also a matter of sincere 
importance to the plaintiff. Time and again the phrase 
''center line of the conduit'' appears in the findings and 
judgment. The court did not adopt plaintiff's Exhibit 
"J" as demonstrating the official center line of the con-
duit and as this exhibit stands in the record it is notmng 
more than evidence. The center line of the conduit A.s 
delineated on Exhibit "J" may or may n'Ot be correct, 
but at least if it had been adopted by the court or -a 
1proper finding that it did show the center line, there 
might have been s•omething tangible on which to hang 
the slopes of safety. However, -a survey made under 
order of the court with appropriate staking of the center 
line of the conduit on the ground would furnish a basi's 
for the slopes 'Of safety described in the judgment which 
cannot now be discovered in the findings. 
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THE EVIDENCE PREPONDERATES THAT 
MAXIMUM SLOPES OF 1 * TO 1 ARE SLOPES 
OF SAFETY FOR PLAINTIFF'S CONDUIT WITH-
OUT REGARD TO THE SURF ACE CONDITIONS 
OF THE SLOPES. 
1. Summary.of .plaintiff's evidence .. ~ 
·Plaintiff's conduit had been in operation and use 
for over 40 years at the time of the trial. The method 
of its construction and installation. was descriJJ(1d 'by 
plaintiff's witness Staker, and sufficie:qt of his. testimony 
has been set forfh in thisbrie£ to inform the. court. as to 
the nature of the conduit and the lil~thods pursued in its 
constru.ction. Of. primary.importance is information as 
to the geological historyof ,the area in \Vhich defendant's 
land is located and through which the conduit •passes. 
The plaintiff obviously submitted its evidence on 
the theory that a slope of 2 feet hori110ntal to 1 foot 
vertical is necessary to afford reasonab~e support for 
the c.onduit. To prove its contention it presented Profes-
sor Ray E. Marsell, of the University of Utah faculty, 
who testified at length concerning the geological origin 
of the soil deposition at the mouth of Big Cotto11woocl 
Canyon. Of great relevancy is information as to the 
composition and compactness of the deposit; its tendency 
to erode and ravel; the effect .of frost, water and wind 
upon it, _and its ability .to support the conduit ·with 
reasonable degree of safety for an indefinite future time. 
Professor J\Iarsell demonstrated his testimony by a 
great num'her of photographs and diagrams. The area 
had been under his observation for several months prior 
to trial. As an expert Professor nlarsell exrpresscd the 
opinion that the deposit at the mouth of Big Cotton-
wood Canyon had been vmshccl out of the canyon and 
thereafter the waters of L:tke Bonneville ro:::e to what 
is known as the Bonneville stage of this prehistoric lake. 
"It lapped against this deposit." But the action of the 
lake water on the deposit had practically no affect. (R. 
394). He considers that the Walker deposit resembles 
that of a glacial moraine (R. 396), and that it was not 
laid down in still water because it has no forset beds 
(R. 398). He 'believes that the material at the Walker 
pit is not compacted material and that the compactness 
that it does possess arose as a result of a sorting process 
of the water (R. 392). He testified further that the 
\Valker deposit is composed of unconsolidated material 
but is locally cemented (R. 405 ). It was Professor Mar-
sell's final conclusion that a slope of safety required 
to protect the conduit should he not less than a slope 
of 2 feet horizontal to 1 foot vertical with a 10 to 12 
foot berm (R. 346, 347 and 496). He reached this con-
clusion by reference to Plaintiff's Exhibit "P" which 
shows an average profile t)'lpical of the profile of spurs 
in the vicinity of the gravel pit. The present ·walker 
pit is located on a spur (R. 346). This ·witness was frank 
in admitting that whether the slope of safety be 2 to 1 
or 1% to 1 it would require seasonal maintenance and 
that the difference in the amount of maintenance would 
he very slight (R. "543). 
Plaintiff's case rests upon Professor Marsell's testi-
mony, although the City Engineer, W. D. Beers, expres-
sed the opinion that u 2 to 1 slope was necessary to sup-
port the conduit (R. 249). He testified further that 
during his incumbency as city engineer that to his knowl-
edge there bad been no occasion to make repairs on the 
95 
conduit embankment, and the city had not to his knowl-
edge taken any action as to erosion (R. 257). As has 
been heretofore demonstrated, Mr. Beer's testimony 
as to the necessity for a 2 to 1 slope in Section 25, is 
qualified by his assumption that the plaintiff's right 
of way over that section is 66 feet in width (R. 252). 
2. Summary of defendant's and intervenm·'s 
evidence. 
As may be expected in litigation of this nature 
wherein expert testimony 1plays such a vital part there 
are sharp differences of opinion on the part of the 
experts. A review of the transcript of the evidence will 
show that each witness was subjected to careful exam-
ination and cross examination and thereby the differ-
ences in their conclusions were sharpened and amplified. 
It is recognized by counsel that in an::tlyzing the evidence 
it is not a. proposition of simply "counting heads" of th2 
experts and thereby concluding that the preponderance 
of the evidence is in favor of one side or the other. 
A critical consideration, not only of the training and 
experience of these witnesses, but also of their oppor-
tunity of observation of tho critical area, is highly uec-
essary. Further, their experience in dealing with g'eo-
logical aud engin0erin2; 11roblems counts heavily in weigh-
ing their testimony. A complete ro:oumc of the evidence 
in this brief y,ronld be nolhiug more 1ltan reproducing 
the transcript. Since printe(1 ahstmcb of the record 
have been abolished i11 this tribwwl, it is hopocl by 
counsel, tlw t the Supreme Cou ;· t l!l coD side rin':!,' th)s c:csc:, 
will review the testimony of the witnesses as it appears 
in the transcript, and that due and proper consideration 
will be given to the numerous exhibits which were intro-
duced in evidence. There are several of the exhibits 
which are of prime importance although all of them 
when considered with the testimony have rele-:ancy and 
materiality. The defendant herein will attemp to su '-
marize cogently and as briefly as possible, the e ilen ( 
which it believes supports its contention lwre~n. '>c~.e 
real issue involved in this action is whether a slope of 
2 feet horizontal to 1 foot vertical is a necessary slope 
of safety to support plaintiff's conduit. Plaintiff's entire 
evidence was directed to the affirmative of this issue. 
The defendant denies that a slope of 2 to 1 is necessary 
to give the requisite support, and asserts that a slorc 
of llh feet horizontal to 1 foot vertical would afforJ 
the conduit such reasonable support as would assure its 
safety for an indefinite period in the future. Superficial 
consideration might lead to the conclusion that this dif-
ference was merely a theoretical one and that in the 
ultimate results the sustaining of plaintiff's position 
would not seriously limit the defendant in the operations 
of its lands nor inflict any damage upon it. However, 
an examination of the conditions existing on the slopes 
below the conduit will reveal that a slope of 2 to 1 will 
prevent the defendant from availing itself of thousands 
of cubic yards of soil material which otherwise would 
have been available for processing and disposition. The 
trial court by offering the defendant an alternative 
method of operation undoubtedly recognized this fact 
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and endeavored to ameliorate its mandates if it held 
strictly to its conclusions that a 2 to 1 slope was neces-
sary to afford reasona:ble support to the conduit. It is 
the contention of defendant that the evidence preponder-
atingly shows that the basic slope ::;hould be 1¥2 feet 
horizontal to 1 foot vertical in::;tead of 2 feet horizontal 
to 1 foot vertical. The court in its judt,:rruent adopt::; as a 
'basic premise the 2 to 1 slope and thereafter introduce::; 
its modifications which is intended to lessen the har::;h-
ness of such conclusion. rrhe defendant in oppo::;ing this 
proposition re::;pectfully submits that the basic slope 
should be 11;2 to 1, and upon 8Uch premise the variations 
and exceptions written into the judgment should he 
based. It is upon this theory tlmt the defendant submits 
for consideration the analy::;is of the evidence hereafter 
set forth. 
(a) The conduit has been and is supported 
in main by slopes averaging less tha~z 11;2 to 1. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit "0" and "P" (R 280-282, 28i~) 
exemplify a profile of a typical slope in the vicinity of 
the active gravel pit, located ~,000 feet south from the 
pit. This slope is shown on Plaintiff's Exhibit "I", a 
photograph, near Ravine 1 (R. 283). The plaintiff placed 
great stress upon Exhibit "P" as demonstrating the 
effect of erosion upon this area. However, Profe::;sor 
Marsell in his examination of the territory found sl01pes 
along the conduit embankment as steep as 1.28 to 1, 
which were natural undisturbed slopes (R. 434). These 
slopes have stood for 40 years without maintenance or 
reconstruction. The intervenor, during thi'S time, made 
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no provision for the drainage of ·wasatch Boulevard in 
the immediate vicinity of the ·walker pit, because of the 
absorptive power of the surrounding soil and earth (R. 
435). In Ravine 4 as appears on Plaintiff's Exhibit 
"Q", the slopes within 20 feet of the bottom of the 
ravine, are 1..51 to 1, 1.37 to 1, and 1.28 to 1 (R. 444). 
The measurements of the slopes on Plaintiff's Exhibits 
"Q" and "R," are the steepest angles of the slopes 
(R ~±GO). The Co<.mty in building ·wasatch Boulevard 
in 1D18 maJe a cut o£ approximately 1.25 to 1 (R. 480). 
ny rcl'e;ring to Plaintiff's Exhibit "R," with use of 
the O'.'erlay (Plaintiff's Exhibit "Q," R. 290), there is 
re;,·ealed the topography of the area appearing on Plain-
tiff's ExhiLit "I," the photograph. In Ravine 1, as 
located on these exhibits, a slope of 1.7 to 1 is dis-
covered. In explaining the sharpness of the slope dis-
covered by him, Professor .Marsell said: 
"The only slopes that I have been able to 
find that are as steep or f:lteeper than the slope 
that we have mentioned so frequently, 1lj2 to 1, 
are on thof:le areas that l1ave been affected arti-
ficially, or those surfaces that are descending 
to tlte ravines, the slopes that descend to the 
ravines.'' ( R 29'1). 
On the east bank of Ravine 4 (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
"P") within 50 feet of the eonduit, up above it and up 
the slopes and in the ravine, there was found by Pro-
fessor ::Jarsell, a slope with the ratio of 1.28 to 1. Fur-
ther to the southeast along one of the cut banks remain-
iug al'ter GO years along the power company's grade, 
is one bank underneath a normal mantle, with a slope 
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of 1 to 1 ( R 335). Along the same hank where the brush 
is absent, the slope ratio underneath the rim is 1.37 to 1 
(R. 336). The slope of 1.28 to 1 is a natural slope inside 
of the ravine, which was perhaps 50 feet long, sloping 
down the side of the ravine (R. 336). In Ravine 7 on 
Plaintiff's Exhibit "I" several measurements show 
slopes as steep as 1.31 to 1. Professor Marsell made 
the following comment: 
''In the production of the grade for the power 
line, fifty years ago, much of the waste material 
was dumped over the slope, and it came to an 
angle of repose which is on the average for 20 feet 
below the original ditch, 1.5 to 1, the angle of 
repose for that aggregate of loose material of that 
character. w·here there has been brush, the brush 
that develops tends to hold the boulders, par-
ticularly the sumac, on the upper side of the 
stems or limbs of the trees and brush. These 
boulders accumulate in a nest like a clutch of eggs, 
and in some of these locations in the oak brush, 
particularly the scrub oak, I have measurements 
of 1.51 to 1; 1.41 to 1; and measurements as low 
as 1.28 to 1 in place::; underneath the conduit; but 
those are all disturbed areas, and as far as I am 
able in my experience to judge, they meet the 
studies I have made. 'L'hey are not typical of the 
natural slopes." (H. 337). 
In considering the data submitted by Professor 
:Marsell as to the slopes found 'by him below the conduit, 
it is recommended that close study be given to Plaintiff's 
Exhibit "I" as correlated to Plaintiff's Exhibits "P," 
"Q," "R," "S" and "T." It should be horne in min<l 
that Professor Marsell made all his measmements at 
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right angles to the slopes and not at right angles to the 
conduit. If his ideal slope of 2 to 1 were placed against 
the conduit, in its turning and twisting around the hill-
side, following the contour thereof, it might in one 
place be a 2 to 1 slope, and 10 feet away this slope would 
be 1l_h to 1 or 1 to 1. 
Turning now to the measurements made by Dr. Hintze 
on l\Iay 25th and 2Gth, 19-19 (R. G57, 658), these weTe 
measurements from the conduit down toward Ylasatch 
Boulevard (R 657). He Jiscovered dip slopes of 30 
degrees (R. 658). A di'P' of 30 degrees would be a 1.73 
to 1 slope. They were made mostly on spurs, and not 
in ravines, located \Vithin 500 feet south from the spur 
on w·hich the ·walker workings are located (R 660). 
There are other slopes measuring as follows: 28 deg'rees, 
or 1.88 to 1; 41 degrees or 1.15 to 1; 3G degrees or L38 
to 1. The a \'erage of these readings is about 34 degrees 
or 1.38 to 1 (R. 661) . 
.i\1r. J. n. ·walker, president of defendant company, 
also made observations on the ground as to the prevail-
ing slopes in that area. Referring to Plaintiff's J1Jxhihit 
"I," he testifwcl that north of the line marked "H" 
thereon, the slopes below the conduit with two exceptions, 
arc of a revose of approximately 1.3 to 1. At the north 
end of the vValker property the slopes approach 1l_h to 1 
(R. 84:)). In the arc>a between the line marked "H" 
and the line ntark£~<1 "C" on Exhibit "I," there is an 
intact slo<pe of about 1.23 or 1.3 to 1 (R. 844). Mr. 
Walker c}wclzed the slopes described by Dr. Hintze (R. 
84±, 8-15). Partir:ularly did Mr. ·walker checl\ the slopes 
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within the area between the gate valve on Plaintiff's 
I:Gxhibit "I," and approximately one half the distance 
between the gate valve and arrow marked '' S. '' Mr. 
Walker measured these slopes by establishing a point at 
right angles to the conduit and with a tape measured 
the dista:n,ce between the conduit and the established 
point (R. 845). The slopes measured by Mr. Walker in 
this area were each from 1. to 1; 1.23 to 1; 1.3 to 1; 1.4 
to 1. The slope of natural repose in this area is about 
1.3 to 1. In his observation he never found a slope of 
1 Y2 to 1 ( R. 846). In the area commencing 100 feet 
north of the gate valve shown on Plaintiff's .BJxhibit 
"I," the slopes are more stable and have not been dis-
turbed. They stand with an average of 1.25 to 1, and LJ 
to 1 for fifteen or sixteen hundred feet (R. 856). vVith 
the exception of two little spurs-one where the present 
pit is located, and one at the end of defendant's pro1perty, 
these are all filled slopes which have stood since the 
conduit was built. The natural mantle existing on the 
slopes north and west of the present workings is very 
sparse. The area has regularly been burned over on an 
average of every three or four years (Defendant's Ex-
hibits 20, 50, 51; R. 847). The rock mantle in that area 
is rock placed at the time of the construction of the 
conduit (R. 847). 
Professor Marsell undoubtedly summarized his con-
clusion as to a slope of safety for the conduit thus: 
"Therefore, I would suggest that, inasmuch 
as this profile on Exhibit "P" shows an average 
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slope, throughout the steeper portion of it, of 
1.95 to 1, we should ask certainly for nothing 
steeper, because the substitute slope must nec-
essarily be a new surface created of unconsoli-
dated material (R. 346). * • • Therefore, I would 
want to see a berm wide enough for, I would say, 
ten or twelve feet or more along the conduit line, 
on the down slope side, with a rounded shoulder, 
and a slope of 2 to 1 from there on down to the 
plane that would intersect the County highway." 
(R. 347). 
The plaintiff built its case around the demonstration 
indicated on its Exhibit "P" and deduced therefrom 
the conclusion stated by Professor Marsell. The de-
fendant controverts this conclusion on the basis that 
Exhibit "P" does not t}~pify the slope conditions in this 
area which have existed for over 40 years. During this 
time the conduit has been operated with a minimum of 
maintenance, if there has 'been any maintenance (R 257-
258). There is not a line of evidence in this case that 
the conduit has been displaced or its underpinning and 
support impaired. Defendant conscientiously believes 
that the evidence proves that the average slopes below 
the conduit in the direction of \Va.satch Boulevard have 
been and are steeper than 1¥2 feet horizontal to 1 foot 
vertical. Over and above the detailed technical evidence 
of the experts there is one fact that stands as self 
evident and that is that the conduit has been sup-
ported since it was constructed across the ·walker land, 
by slopes less than 1¥2 to 1. A close study of the evi-
'dence suggests strongly the idea. that no 2 to 1 slope 
below the conduit actually exists on the Walker land, and 
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never has existed. If there are any such slopes they 
are exceedingly few. vVhile the judgment does not 
require the defendant to build 2 to 1 slopes where none 
natural1y existed, the case for the plaintiff appears to 
resolve itself into one where a 2 to 1 slope has heen 
created on paper but no such slore actually exists on 
the ground. There is demonstrated hrre again tlw hasis 
of defendant's contention that the court should han· 
orde1·ed cross section surveys of SH<'h fre(ll18ncy as to 
demonstrate that its findings an<l judgment are based 
on ph~·sica] facts and not on mere hypot1Jetieal dcdue-
tions. 
Unrlouhtedly the court's findings and jndgt:JPnt rep-
resent his sincere and lwnest opinion of what slopes 
should 'he maintained in order to give reasona1Jlc support 
to the condnit, hut it is submitted th:tt the most f~wor­
able interpretation of the evidence docs not support tlJis 
conclusion. 
(b) An average slope of 1Jj2 to 1, zcith 
~·arianccs of the nahtre authorized by Paragraph 
5 of the judgment, will afford ad.eq_uate protec-
tion fo.r the conduit. 
Opposed to Professor l\:farsell 's conclusion that a 
2 to 1 slope is necessary to give adequate support to 
the conduit, is the testimony of an equally learned and 
experienced geologist and competent and experienced 
engineers. Their considered opinions have largely been 
ignored by the court in formulating the fiwlings and 
judgment. 
Dr. Hintze differed in some res p:::cts from Proi'cm:Jol' 
Marsell in hi'S hi'Storical ac::ount of the sand an::l gravel 
deposit at the mouth of Big Cottonwood Canyon. He 
stated: 
"So I prefer to consider this material o£ ~he 
\Valker pit as being a part of a deposit which was 
laid in Lake Bonneville. Now, I do not believe 
that it mali.:es a very great deal of difference 
whether it was laid in Lake Bonneville or whether 
it was laid up as a slope which was laid in water. 
I think we are agreed on that. It was water-borne, 
and water-laid material, without a doubt. So, as 
to whether 1\.Ir. 1\[arsell 's view, or the older and 
more general view, that these deposit'S belong to 
the Lake Bonneville stage, would not have too 
much to do with this case. However, that it was 
laid in water is very important, because any 
material deposited in water is apt to be com-
pacted and particles settle and adjust themselves 
and get into a settled condition in water, much 
more so than out there in the stock pile which 
i'S being formed by the material loosely clumped 
down in the valley. * * * I regard this deposit, 
therefore partially cemented, as it seems to be, 
from this position here, and partially compacted 
as well settled material. r_rhat is the way I would 
like to dcscri'!Je it-well settled material, partially 
cemented; and I think that partial cementation 
runs throughout the deposit, he.cause I have a 
specimen here that I got out of the Walker pit 
this morning-one in particular, that-if I might 
have the privilege of vresenting it now, I would 
like to lJl'P~ent it, heeause we are just about reach-
ing a ~;topping point." (R. 612, 61:3). Defendant's 
l~xhihits 27 (H. G21); Exhibit 28 (R. 628); and 
J'Jxhihit 2~) (R G30), demonstrated the cementa-
tion of the deposit." 
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The exhibits last mentioned by Dr. Hintze, together 
with defendant's Exhibits 4 to 15, are fairly and reason-
ably representative of the contents of the Walker deposit. 
The deposit possesses coherence and compa~ctness (R. 
634). 
Dr. Hintze declared with respect to the excavations 
of defendant: 
"I do not believe that the excavations have 
produced anything that might be regarded with 
apprehension." (H. 675). 
He further stated that the removal of the soil had 
not altered the drainage of Havine 6 and 7 (R. 675). 
Further commenting, he said: 
'' \Ve see scars in these photographs, the 
scars north of Gulches 4, or Havine 4, 5 and G 
are V'ery ipronounced, and, for the most part, 
have no vegetation growing on them. Yet, after 
about fifty years they show this tendency for very 
slow erosion on the surface, with some rna terial 
rolling down to the foot of the slope, and the upper 
part of the slope taking on that extra steepness 
which has been emphasized here. I think the very 
top of each one of these slopes is steeper than 
the slope itself, in the main part; so the surface 
is a kind of concave surface that flattens out at 
the base and becomes medium in the middle 
reaches, and then rises to an extra declivity near 
the top. That, r think, is the effect of erosion 
on the denuded surface's. Elsewhere more of the 
slopes are covered with bushes of considerable 
size, which have grown up ov~r the years; never 
were disturbed by the workings or construction 
of the conduit. So, it is hard to say just how 
old they are, but they may be hundreds of ~·ears 
old-if nny plant can live that long. Otherwise, 
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they are a younger generation, with the older 
ones died off and gone, perhaps, hut I would still 
believe that the slo1pe has probably been covered, 
and may have been forested, as pointed out here, 
long ago when the climate was more favorable to 
plant growth than it is at the present time. So, 
my judg1nent would be that any reasonable slope, 
as the slope of 1 to 1, or 11;2 to 1, or 2 to 1, would 
be a reasonable slope (R. 677). * * * A 11;2 slope 
to 1, would be as safe, or safer, than the natural 
slopes thal are present adjacent to the Walke.r 
u:orkin:;s." (R. 678) . 
.L~s heretofore recited in Dr. Hintze's testimony, 
this slope of 11;2 to 1 would commence at the upper west 
edge of the conduit (R 679). He finally emphasized 
his position by stating: 
"Of conr:;e, if you undermine it (the conduit) 
that is a different matter, but if you have a slope 
of 1 to 1, or anything greater than 1 to 1, I t}~:n' 
you have a very safe slore? e':ce0t fer t'v'::c -,, 
f1oo~ls, or somethin!j li:::e that, which P<'Y ft i 
this. If they did, around th~ s SflL', a ' 
slor:-e, as the question r'-'OiJOS2l Ol' I'C: . -. • 
would te extl'a safe. I thinlr i: -r:oul~~- .. v---
extra snfe, a slope like that." 
In response to a question by counsel for the inter-
venor as to how mucl1 more rapidly e.::·osion woui -: r_ffcct 
the slope of 11;2 to 1 as it would a slope of 2 to 1 on the 
kind of material that is exposed at the VT alker pit, Dr. 
Hintze replied: 
'' rrhe illlmeuiate effect on the material, I 
think, would not be very different in those two 
cases, for the reason that they are both very l1igh 
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slopes for running water. * * * So, when you talk 
about the difference between the erosion on a 
slope of 1% and the erosion on a 2 to 1 slope-
1% to 1, or 2 to 1-you are not talking ahout 
anything very different. * * * But it is not a 
<lUestion, in my mind, as to a 2 to l slope being 
much safer than a l% to 1. gven a l to l slope 
there, I think you would maintain them all, and 
the maintenance o.f one \Vould not be very differ-
ent from the maintenance of another." (R. 683). 
Mr. John E. Kay, Assistant County }1~ngineer, direct-
ed the improvement of Wasatch Boulevard. His exper-
ience as an engineer in this type of work peculiarly 
qualifies him as an expert. He was asked : 
'' * * * what, in your 01pinion, should be the 
slope to give adeqate support to the Salt Lake 
City conduit?" (R 718). 
He responded: 
''In this particular area I would sa.y from 
a 1 to 1 to a 2 to l, would not make any difference, 
it would he just as substantial." 
Further interrogation of him was as follows: 
"Q. That is, you make no distinction hetwe1en a 
l to 1 ancl a 2 to l ¥ 
A. No. 
"I would say very definitely that a 1:Y2 to 1 
slope would be flat enough to take care of any-
thing that I might find along there, and I based 
that, with reference to the slope's that I saw, 
both along that area that appeared to have stood 
there for years on end." (R.. 765). 
The following pertinent colloquy contained in the 
testimony is quoted: 
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'' Q. In your surveys that you made of the vValker 
gravel pit area, did you find steeper slopes 
than llh to 1 ~ 
A. I did. 
Q. ·where are they~ 
A. As shown on Exhibit 26, I have noted here a 
slope that was approximately 100 feet north-
west of the manhole. 'J1hat slope is steeper 
than llh to 1. 
Q. Is that the natural slotpe? 
A. 'l'lmt is the natural slope here, inasmuch 
as it appears not to have been disturbed for 
years. It may have been disturbed at the time 
the conduit was built-I don't know. 
Q. Can you identify that natural slope upon 
Exhibit I1 
A. It is approximat~ely in this location (indi-
cating). 
Q. \V ell now, you have to indicate that, for the 
benefit of the record. 
A. 'l'here is a dotted ink line, marked ''G.'' 
Q. (By the Court) That is a cross section, isn't 
it 1 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. (By 1\L-. Hiter) It appears on defendant's 
Exhibit 261 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. In reaching the conclusion just stated, have 
you considered the etfect of rainfall or rnois-
hue upon the workings~ 
A. You mean in the vicinity of this vVallcer pit1 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. On the slopes 7 
A. On the Rlopes. That material is of such a 
nature tlw t there docs not appear to be any 
rnn-off. 'l'hc water appears to immediately 
soak in as it falls. 
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Q. In your experience with the slo1pes of 11/2 
to 1 that you have described, you consider 
the factor of safety is the same in both 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you selected a. 1 to 1 for the purpose 
of this highwa.y1 
A. ],or economic reasons, yes. 
Q. Considering the, factor of safety7 
A. Yes. If I may, I will qualify that statement 
by 'Saying 'whatever slope is established, 
or whatever the highway slope is placed 
upon, I will qualify that statement by say-
ing that the slope should be trimmed, the 
loose material taken off, and the slope round-
ed at the top with probably a. 20 foot radius. 
"' "' . 
Q. (By Mr. Riter) Then, Mr. Kay, with your 
qualifwation, that would have been the policy 
prevailing in this area on any cuts that you 
made for this highway7 
A. Yes. 
Q. And those are on a 1 to 1 slope~ 
A. The way they are designed, a 1 to 1 slope, 
yes.'' (R. 720). 
The testimony of Mr. Jack H. Craven, an exper-
ienced, qualified engineer, has heretofore been set forth 
at length under Point V, sub-para.gmph 1. It is only 
necessary to re-quote the statement he made in response 
to the question as to his opinion concerning the slope 
that should be maintained in order to provide necessary 
stability and safety for the conduit. He declared: 
''My conclusion is that the slope would be 
1% to 1 slope, particularly in running the em-
hankmen t" ( R. 804), 
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Mr. LeRoy C. Chadwick, defendant's engineer, who 
prepared its Exhibits 23, 24, 25 and 26 (R 556, 558, 
560, 762), after describing his experience on numerous 
occasions with filled slopes declared that the standard 
for years had been for a slope of llh to 1 and that all 
filled slopes for highways and railroads-the filled slopes 
according to accept'ed standards were 11f2 to 1, and that 
cut slopes were 1 to 1 or steeper (R. 764). He gave a 
definite opinion as to the slopes below the plaintiff's 
conduit which would afford the required feature of 
safety in supporting the conduit, as follows: 
Q. (con 'td.) Have you ever had an opportunity 
to observe erosive effect of wind or min or 
frost 1 
A. To some extent, yes. 
A. r.l'he effects of wind, rain and erosion, of 
course, on various 'slopes are all variable, 
depending upon the type of material, the 
ground, the rainfall, the rate that it falls-
there are so many variables in there, and 
it varies in different localities; \Vit'h different 
types of soil<s. 
Q. Considering the type of the soil, and the 
nature of diggings at the Walker gravel pit, 
what it your opinion as to the effect of wind, 
rain, frost, snow, moisture - on a 1¥2 to 1 
slope? 
A. I don't think, from all of the appe,arances in 
the vincinity, I don't think there should be 
very much weathering, a minor amount, 
Nmt engineering could not take of. In ca1se of 
cloudbursts or such things as that a llh to 1 
-a 3 to 1 will wash it as easily as a 11;2 to 1." 
(TI-765, 7GG, 767). 
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L. R. Dunkley, project engineer m charge of con-
struction of the Deer Creel;: Aqueduct (H-738-739), was 
an important witness for the defendant. The Deer Creek 
Aqueduct is cons,tructed through tlw \Y alker land ( R-
739). Mr. Dunkley was personally in dw.rge of this work 
and \Vas intimately acquainted with the location of the 
Salt Lake City Big Cottonwood Conduit with relation 
to the Deer Creek Aqueduct (R-740). He had Leen on 
the ·walker property on numerous occasions (H-7c10). 
Defendant's Exhibits 42 and 4:3, (H-H8, 730, 731), are 
maps of tJhe loca:tion of the Salt Lake City or Deer Creek 
Aqueduct on the VI alker property and on ]n·opcrty im-
mediately adjoining it on the north. 'l'lwse exhibits were 
properly identified by Mr. Dunkley (l~-747-749). On 
defendant's Exhibit 43 are eight cross sections of the 
aqneduct which show the Salt Lake CiLy conduit "<;cming 
around the hill." (11-750). ~lr. DunUey said: 
":,, "' ~· and by the way, thai is the only point 
in the \Valker property where the Salt Lake aque-
duct interferes with the present natnrul grottml 
slope, in mder t:o do \vhat we felt would pro:cct 
the Salt Lake City conduit, above it-it is shown 
on this little sketch in the upper left-hand corner 
(referring to defendant's Exhibit 4i)). ·~ "' 'flw 
eritic,al area, as far as our Salt Lake aqueduct is 
concerned. * " ·~ On the \Valker property." (H-
749-750). 
l\fr. Dunkley was asked: 
H Q. \Vhn.t in your opnnon as an cnginct'r, 1s a 
slope tlwt would Lc adequate tu afrod ~' 
reasonable degree of safety to the Salt Lake 
conduit where it crO'sses that part of the 
Walker workings where active operations 
are being conducted~ 
• • • 
A. '.rhe materials being the same as they are 
here, I would say a 1~'2 to 1, to a 2 to 1 sl;· e" 
(TI-753, 754). 
Later he sta~e:l: 
"Q. 0 ] . n a1 unlsue-J S10}~E>S on ~,.e ,__, "c L. c L •••• ~ 
duc1t, and numerous canal jobs the s~ope o, 
1¥2 to 1, or flatter, is usually used. In certain 
materials south of Sandy, and in the vicinity 
o£ Draper, we had to use flatter slopes than 
we are using here, on account of the materials 
we encountered in this particular area, in 
order to afford lateral support for the Salt 
Lake City conduit, we are back filling this 
excavated area, back to the natural ground 
slope; and in that area that slope is approxi-
mately llh to 1. 
Q. And you consider that safe 7 
A. rJ'hat is as safe as you can make it because 
that is the natural slope that existed there 
before we started our construction ·work. 
Q. As a ma:tter of fact, some of that natural slope 
there is below 11;2 to 1, isn't it~ 
A. There are a few isolated cases where a 
steeper slope from the Salt Lake City conduit, 
than 1¥2 to 1, does exist. 
Q. The original ground line i's riding on 1¥2 to 1, 
isn't it? 
A. In this particular area, yes. 
Q. Vvhen yon back filled, yon filled up that de-
clivity as indicated in Defendant's Exhibit 3. 
You have it back to a 1¥2 to 1 slope 7 
A. That is right. 
Q. And you reg-ard that as adequate for the pro-
tection of the Sa:lt Lrake Citv cronduit 7 
A. All we are trying to do is to ~eplace the part 
that we had to tempor,arily cut ·out, to con-
struct our pipe line." (R-758-75~)). 
Mr. J. B. Walker, who testified that he had had years 
of experience in construction work and rparticularly in 
handling soil and earth (R-768), was asked if a lVz to 1 
slope properly dre,ssed would produce a 'safe slope for 
the Sah Lake City conduit. He answered: 
''It would be more than adequate. A 1.25 and 
1.3 slope will produce all the stability and al'l of 
the protection that yon can get out ·of thrat mate-
ria;! in place, and anything above tlmt is merely 
providing an additional margin, with nothing to 
be gained, as far as prope'r protecrtion is cron-
cerned.'' ( R-863). 
Defendant particu}arly requests the Supreme Court 
to examine Defendant '·s Exhibits 3, 42 and 43, in the 'light 
of l\Ir. Dunkley's testimony. It will there be seen that 
not farther disrtant than 600 feet from the defendant's 
a(?,tive opemtions, the Deer Oreek Aqueduct has been 
cO'Il:structed at the "critical point" de'scribed by Mr. 
Dunkley. The aqueduct comes into such close proximity 
with the conduirt that the engineers of the Redamation 
Service gave special 'coTisidera.tion to the question of 
latera;l support for the conduit. Judicial notice may be 
taken of the notorious :Da:c:t that the plajntiff corporation 
is direcHy interested in the Deer Creek Aqueduct, and 
that it is being built to 'Supply water for the plaintiff city. 
\Ve have here presented a spectacular contrast. Insofar 
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a1s defendant and intervenor are concerned in their re-
spective activities, the plaintiff insists that a slope of 2 
to 1 or even flatter, is necessary to afford its conduit 
adequate support and to insure its safety. N otwithstand-
ing this fact, a little more than 600 feet distant, the plain-
tiff does not quarrel with another branch of its govern-
ment when that hranch plows down a hillside below its 
CJonduit to install another water aquedect In this s 'hCl''e 
a 'slope 'Of 11/z to 1 is adequate to tprotect the conduit. It 
is very difficult to understand this distinction. Evidently 
in dealing with third persons, such as the defendan~ an~ 
intervenor, the plaintiff demands that they meet a mo1·e 
rigid and higher standard of conduct than the city prac-
tices itself. In this connection it is interesting to note the 
following excerpt from the record during 1Ir. Dunkley''s 
examination: 
"Q. (By Mr. Riter) Now, 1\ir. Dunkley, will you 
indicate to trhe court and describe to the court 
the conditions ~on the ground in this criticra1 
area., with the resultant delineations upon 
1botth of these exl1ibits 1 
MR. CHRIST'EN~SEN: \Ve object to t·hat a:s 
wholly immaterial to any issue in this case. It is 
not in tlle area in question. It does not make any 
difference how dangerous ror how safe that may 
be." (R-7Gl). 
In order to offset this damaging evidence the plain-
tiff on eros's examination asked Mr. Dun1dey: 
"Q. Is it your purpose, when you fina:lly finish 
this off, to refill ·over your aqueduct, with 
material, to estahl.ish the same slope it had 
before that was cut out~" 
Mr. Dunkley answered in the affirmative. (R-760). 
He further testified tha:t the soil would he compacted 
I 
"with equipment" (R-760), and it was the desire not to 
disturb any natural vegetation if it c1o'lud he avoided. (R-
760). He stated it would be between 50 and 60 feet from 
the top of the aqueduct 'cut and filled to the Salt Lake 
City aqueduct (R-761). N~otwithstanding this attempt 
to mitigate the effect of Mr. Dunkley's te'stimony, and 
exhibits, the eold hard fact remains that the slope below 
the conduit and extending to the aqueduct, is a 1% to 1 
s}ope~a 's:lope recognized a.s standard by the Reclamation 
Service and as expressed by Mr. Dunkley, an adequate 
slo1pe of 'safety. The defendant asks this pertinent ques-
tion: Why is a slope of 1112 to 1 a slope of safety for the 
conduit when the Deer Creek Aqueduct is concerned, but 
is a. fearful threat to the safety of the conduit when the 
defenda1nt and intervenor are concerned? 
While there obviously existrs in the record a direct 
conflict of testimony which was the duty of a trial court 
to resolve, it is t[le earnest and sincere belief of the de-
fendant that the evidence presented by it, supporting its 
contention that a slope of safety for the conduit ~s llh 
to 1 or less, so far preponderates that the court's finding 
of a 2 to 1 slope is not supported by the evidence. Here 
is one of these peculiar cases of rare o(!currence where 
the ,conduct of the witnesses and their demeanor on the 
stand is of minor ~significance in resolving a conflict in 
evidence. AH witnesses in this case are men of rectitude 
and honor, and the expert's in their exhaustive study of 
ll(j 
the situation and in giving their evidence manifestly only 
desired to elucidate the truth as they saw and understood 
it. When one reads the cold record of trial he must 
reach the conclusion that defendant's evidence in respect 
to the slopes of safety clearly preponderates. 
Article VIII, Section 9, of the Utah Constitution pro-
vides: 
"In equity casers the arppeal may he on ques-
tions of both law and fac.t; in eases a.t law the ap-
peal shall be on questions of law alone." 
The Supreme Court of Utah in discussing this tpro-
vision of the State Constitution, 'said: 
"Under this provision, it will he observed, 
an appeal may be taken in equity cases on ques-
tions of fact as weU as of law. The appellate court, 
·therefore, by necessary intendment and implica-
tion, ha's trhe same jurisdiction and power in equity 
cases to determine questions of fact as of law, 
and may go behind the findings and decree of the 
trial court, consider all the evidence, decide on 
which side the preponderance thereof is, ascertain 
whetheT or nO't the proof justifies the findings and 
decree, and enter or direct such findings and 
decree to be entered as the evidence, in the judg-
ment of the appellate tribunal, may justify." 
(Whittaker v. Ferguson, 16 Utah 240,51 Pac. 
980.) 
This rule has been affirmed innumerable times. In Tripp 
v. Bagley, 74 Utah 57, 276 Pac. 913, 917, is writt.en: 
''Counsel have regarded this proceeding as a 
suit in equity, and we so consider it. In such case 
it becomes our duty to review questions of both 
the law and the facts.'' 
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The c'onclusion must be that slopes of 1% to 1 commenc-
ing at the edge of a. berm of 15 £eet in width on the 
westerly side of the conduit, will afford the conduit 
reasonable support and insure it's safety for an indefinite 
time to come, and the Supreme Court should so find. 
CONCLUSION 
This i's an equity cause in whic:h the Supreme Court 
may reach its uwn conclusions as to the fact's, and may 
enter a judgment consistent with its decision. 
(Mellon v. Vondor-Horst Brothers, 44 Uurn 
300; 144 Pac. 130, 136.) 
The Supreme Court ha1s stated: 
"* * * we are satisfied from the fads shown 
that the appellants are entitled to the use of more 
water than is awarded them in the decree of the 
court below, and that the deeree of the court be-
low, as well as the findings of facts, ·should be 
modified and made more certain, so as to settle 
the whole controversy between the parties,-settle 
it so that it may be ascertained with reasonable 
certainty how much the court has decreed in favor 
of either party without a re::;ort to further pro-
ceedings. This should be done upon the proofs 
taken in the case without the necessity of award-
ing a. new trial. * * * This case is remanded, with 
directions to the court below to modify the deeree 
and findings so as to conf·orm to this opinion.'' 
(Salina Creek Irrigation Co. v. Salina Stock 
Company, 7 Utah 456; 27 Pac. 578, 579; 
Affirm. 163 U.S. 109, 41 L. Ed. 90, 16 S. 
Ct. 1036.) 
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The following quotation is also pertinent to the ac-
tion which in the opinion of the defendant should be 
taken by the Supreme Court in this case: 
'' ( 4) In the case of Baker v. Hatch, Sheriff, 
et al., 70 Utah 1, 257 P. 673, this court held that 
in equity cases the primary duty to make findings 
of bet upon the issues rests upon the shoulders 
of the trial court, and that it:s failure to make a 
finding upon a material issue 1s reversible error 
(see also Pike v. Clark et al., 95 U ta!h 235, 79 P. 
2d 1010), but that where the evidence is not in con-
flict or greatly preponderate's one way or the 
other, this court not infrequently makes its own 
finding's of fact--that under Section 6995, C.L. 
1917, Sec. 104-41-23, U.C.A. 1943, it has the right 
to make its own findings of fact. Furthermore, it 
may affirm tho lower court's action and return the 
case with directions to make findings upon the 
material iS'snos. Daird v. Upper Canal Irr. Co., 70 
Utah 57,257 P. 1060." 
(Dahl v. Cayias, 110 Utah 398; 174 Pac. (2d) 
430.) 
Defendant respectfully submHs tha:t the findings of 
facts and judgment in thi's action should be modified in 
such degree and manner as will be consistent with its 
contentions herein made, and that the cause he remanded 
to the trial .court with directions: ('a) to modify and 
amend the findings of fact and judgment consistent wit-h 
the decision of the Supreme Court, herein; (b) to cause 
cross section surveys of defendant's land below plain-
tiff's conduit to be made at such frequent intervals a:s 
the trial court may deem advisable und to pre·serve the 
field notes and records of such survey in the records of 
thi's cause; (e) to determine the width of plaintiff's right 
of way easement across Section 25 aforesaid; (d) to 
cause survey '0£ the center line of plaintiff's conduit to 
be made and marked upon the ground and the field notes 
and records of said survey to be preserved in the records 
of this cause; (e) to cause a survey of plaintiff's right 
of way e~asement a!Cross Section 24 and 25 to be made 
after the court has determined the width of said ease-
men:t across Se,ction 2'5 and to order that the said right 
of way be marked upon the ground, and the field note~ 
and records of said ~survey be preserved in the re-cords 
of this cause. 
Respectfully submitted, 
FRANKLIN RITER, 
FR,ED L. F'INLINSON, 
Attorneys for Defend!wnt awd 
Appellant. 
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